

BUREAUCRACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CLARIFYING AND EXPANDING OUR VIEW OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION

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This review aims to redress the growing gap between the receding discourse on bureaucracy and bureaucracy's continuing presence as the predominant organizational form. Reviewing a century of organizational research on bureaucracy, we find three main perspectives, which developed in succession but persist in parallel: bureaucracy as an organizing principle, as a paradigmatic form of organization, and as one type of structure among others. We argue that these three perspectives should be brought into closer dialogue and expanded, so we can overcome the decontextualized, reified, and atomized ways in which bureaucracy is often viewed. To that end, we offer three pathways to stimulate future research—exploring bureaucracy in its wider context, bureaucracy in action, and bureaucracy's interdependencies and configurations. Finally, we discuss how we can better understand the various guises in which bureaucracy continues into the 21st century.

The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economic enterprises, interest groups, endowments, clubs, and many others [...] The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the realm of administration.


—Weber, 1921/1978: 223

Technological, competitive, and political changes in recent decades have reconfigured the organizational landscape, and in this context bureaucracy has

been receding in both general and scholarly discourse (see Figures 1 and 2). This shift, however, is in stark contrast to the reality on the ground: bureaucracy has proven remarkably durable in management practice. Most organizations still rely on core features of bureaucracy, such as hierarchies of authority, specialized functions, and formalized processes (Marsden, Cook, & Kalleberg, 1994), and their relative performance still depends on how thoroughly firms implement those elements (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). Walton's (2005) meta-analysis of 64 primary statistical studies found a high level of covariance among structural characteristics of bureaucracy and found no evidence that this coherence had diminished over time in studies published between 1960 and 1999. In both public and private sector organizations, especially larger ones, instrumental rationality remains the predominant "regime of justification," and the legitimacy of a hierarchy of authority remains taken for granted (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). Bureaucracy continues to flourish even in settings where we might imagine it is irrelevant, such as grassroots initiatives (Florian, 2018), hippie-like collectives (Chen, 2009), terrorist groups (Shapiro, 2013), technology startups (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999), and online communities (O'Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). Thus, while much of what we read would have us believe otherwise, Weber's view quoted in the epigraph

We would like to thank Marya Besharov and Stuart Bunderson for their editorial guidance. We are also very thankful for the generous comments received on earlier drafts from Samantha Ortiz, Nevena Radoynovska, Lyn Cheng, Ruthanne Huising, Davide Nicolini, Esther Leibel, Kirstine Zinck Pendersen, Paul du Gay, Renate Meyer, Thomas Lodrup-Hjorth, Louise Jørring, Nicole Biggart, Jone Pearce, Steve Barley, Peer Fiss, Bob Hinings, Charles Heckscher, Fabrizio Ferraro, Olga Noselova, Clemens Mungesenat, Matt Hurst, and Jerry Davis. The paper benefitted from comments and general support from members of the Ethnography Atelier Writing Group and seminar participants at the OCE center (EM Lyon), the POVI center (Copenhagen Business School), and AOM 2021. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the invaluable editing work of Miranda Lewis.

FIGURE 1
Frequency of the Term “Bureaucracy” Over Time




Source: Google NGram.

above might well still be valid. Therefore, it is vital that we renew our efforts to understand this organizational form.

A renewed effort is but also important because, notwithstanding the considerable accumulated volume of research, key empirical questions about bureaucracy remain unresolved. Debate continues on whether bureaucracy is adaptable and flexible enough to absorb dynamic and unpredictable change (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Gittell, 2001; Heckscher, 2015; Lee & Edmondson, 2017). Scholarship remains conflicted on the relation between bureaucracy and innovation (Craig, 1995; Damanpor, 1996; Dougherty & Corse, 1995), on the relationship between bureaucracy’s efficiency rationale and its

cultural (il)legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Meyer & Bromley, 2013), and on the impact of new technologies as either strengthening or obsoleting it (Faraj, Pachidi, & Sayegh, 2018; Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2020; Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner, & Höllerer, 2017). Whether bureaucracy has a positive or negative effect on alienation and satisfaction remains in dispute (Finlay, Martin, Roman, & Blum, 1995; Miller, 1967; Organ & Greene, 1981; Shantz, Alfes, Bailey, & Soane, 2015). The extent to which “new” or “alternative” organizational forms have replaced bureaucracy—rather than simply giving it a new appearance—remains a thorny theme (Clegg, Harris, & Höpfl, 2011; Courpasson & Reed, 2004; Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994a; Turco, 2016).

FIGURE 2
Percentage of Papers on Bureaucracy versus All Papers Published in U.S. and European Journals across Decades



In addition, the role of bureaucracy in responding to the “grand challenges” and “wicked problems” of our time is under debate (Adler, 2015; Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; Kattel, Drechsler, & Karo, 2019).

To address the divide between discourse and reality and resolve these persistent empirical questions, we need, first, to take our distance from the widely despised stereotypes of bureaucracy. Many people love to hate bureaucracy, whether in the management press (e.g., Hamel & Zanini, 2017), in popular culture (such as in Terry Gilliam’s movie *Brazil*), or in political discussions (see Lopdrup-Hjorth & du Gay, 2020). This animus often seeps into scholarly work, where bureaucracy appears too often not as a possible predictor or outcome variable but as a pejorative term synonymous with red tape, administrative burden, or wasteful overhead.

Putting aside stereotypes and reviewing the past century of scholarship, we find that much of the confusion concerning bureaucracy’s prevalence and effects stems from differences in the conceptualization of bureaucracy itself. Bureaucracy has been understood variously as an organizing principle, as the paradigmatic form of modern organization, and as one type of structure among others. These three perspectives, along with variants within each, emerged in succession and have persisted in parallel, leaving our field with a confused and confusing body of research.

The goal of this review is therefore to clarify the competing understandings of bureaucracy and chart some directions for a revitalized program of research that can help us engage more effectively with the reality of bureaucracy today. We start by outlining the scope and spirit of our review, then discuss the three main perspectives on bureaucracy that we have found in the literature and the variants within each. We note their evolving shares of publications in U.S. and European organization and management journals, and we argue that they are best understood as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. We suggest that by bringing these three perspectives into closer dialogue with each other we can avoid decontextualized, reified, and atomized views of bureaucracy. We offer three research pathways to overcome such limitations and discuss how a renewed understanding allows us to make better sense of the current organizational landscape, where bureaucracy in its various guises coexists with—and appears to be holding its own in competition with—alternative forms of organization.

SCOPE AND SPIRIT OF THE REVIEW

Our review focuses on bureaucracy as a form of organization, rather than the administrative arm of

government (“the bureaucracy”), or the specialized staff functions found in larger formal organizations (Blau & Scott, 1964; Scott, 2007). We target literature in the field of management and organization studies, and we include scholarship in sociology and public administration where it is relevant. Given our focus, we leave for future research the specific organizational challenges of government bureaucracies and staff functions.

Our research proceeded in two phases. The first phase was exploratory and aimed to provide us with a panorama of the evolution of research on bureaucracy. We used a snowball process, looking for the most influential texts that have shaped the way bureaucracy has been understood and studied. This included not only management journal articles but also a wide range of monographs and publications in the broader social sciences. In a second phase, we mapped in more detail the evolution of research on bureaucracy in leading management and organization journals. We used the Web of Science platform to compile all papers using the term “bureau*” in the abstract, title, or keywords in leading U.S. (*Administrative Science Quarterly*, *Academy of Management Journal*, *Academy of Management Review*, and *Organization Science*) and European (*Organization Studies*, *Journal of Management Studies*, and *Human Relations*) journals from their first year of publication to 2019.¹ A potential limitation of this sampling strategy is that it did not allow us to capture papers that may address aspects of bureaucracy in the body but do not refer to the concept in the search fields.

We put aside the publications in which bureaucracy was used in its pejorative meaning (e.g., red tape) or appeared only incidentally in the text, or where it fell outside our scope. The result was a corpus of 187 papers. We read and analyzed these publications according to how bureaucracy has been understood and studied. Specifically, we coded papers according to their conceptualizations of bureaucracy, analytical goals, and research foci and findings. This analysis, together with the insights gleaned from our broader reading of the literature in the first phase, revealed three distinctive perspectives on bureaucracy. We then coded all papers according to the perspectives (outlined below). Appendix A, Table A1 presents the complete list of papers coded according to the

¹ We also examined *Strategic Management Journal* and *Management Science*. Our search in the former yielded only nine papers, of which only two fit our scope; and in the latter, it yielded seven papers, none of which fit our scope.

different perspectives, and Appendix A, Table A2 provides examples of different characterizations of bureaucracy across perspectives.

THE STARTING POINT: MAX WEBER

Elements of bureaucracy arose millennia ago, with the emergence of the first cities, but the modern bureaucratic form dates back about two centuries (Crooks & Parsons, 2016; Schott, 2000). It was through Max Weber, especially his magnum opus *Economy and Society* (e.g., Weber, 1921/1978), that the study of bureaucracy in both ancient and modern forms entered management and organization scholarship.

While the term had been previously used pejoratively to refer to government officials and rule by such officials, Weber approached it with scientific neutrality: examining bureaucracy as a form of organization, he identified its distinctive features, and pointed out that they were common to both the public and private sectors (Albrow, 1970). While extraordinarily rich in theoretical and empirical insights, most of *Economy and Society*, including its “Bureaucracy” chapter (Chapter 11 [Weber, 1921/1978: 956–1005]), is unsystematic and was left unfinished. It only came to us through the efforts of his wife (and scholar in her own right), Marianne Weber (Hanke, 2009). The work entered English-language scholarship through translations by Parsons (Parsons, 1937; Weber, 1948), Gerth and Mills (Weber, 1946) Shils and Finch (Weber, 1949), and Roth and Wittich (Weber, 1921/1978). In this process, it suffered significant changes in meaning, which encouraged multiple interpretations, as discussed below (for previous discussions on translation and interpretation issues, see Baehr, 2001, 2001; Du Gay, 2008; Gajduschek, 2003; Hennis, 1983; Schreurs, 2000; Tribe, 2007, 2019; Weiss, 1983).

In most of his work, Weber addressed bureaucracy as an “ideal type”—that is, “neither an empirical generalization nor a normative value, but a ‘reference point’” (Albrow, 1990: 149–157). Weber’s use of ideal types has generated considerable debate (Hekman, 1983; Swedberg, 2018). For the present purposes, however, it suffices to say that his bureaucratic ideal type is a model which, if fully developed, would be the most “efficient” form for a complex organization—i.e., the most instrumentally rational, the most effective, in meeting the organization’s goals, whatever they may be. In Weber’s evolutionary view, the early bureaucracies of ancient Egypt or China were bureaucracies only in germ form: they had a hierarchy of authority and division of labor, but they were not fully rationalized

either in their formal structure or in their informal relations. Instead, they were based on traditionalism or charisma, combined with expediency and brute force. An adequate concept of bureaucracy, Weber argued, must be based not on the features common to bureaucracy across the ages, but on the features which characterize its “most advanced” form—the instrumentally rational ideal typical bureaucracy.

Box 1 shows Weber’s list of characteristics of the bureaucratic ideal type in *Economy and Society’s* Chapter 3 (“The Types of Legitimate Domination” [Weber, 1921/1978: 220–221]), and Box 2 reproduces the list of bureaucracy’s features that opens Chapter 11 (“Bureaucracy” [Weber, 1921/1978: 956–958]). Subsequent authors have offered distillations of these original lists, usually highlighting the following features: (a) individuals fulfill specialized roles; (b) there is a hierarchy of offices, with higher levels supervising lower ones; (c) written rules and procedures cover regular operations; (d) hiring and promotion are based on technical competence; and (e) there is a general attitude of impersonality in one’s conduct in the sphere of work, a sphere that is understood as separate from the sphere of private life. These features, however, represent but one aspect of the Weberian conceptualization.

Weber studied bureaucracy as an organizational, cultural, and political phenomenon, with different aspects coming into focus in different discussions. He examined bureaucracy’s variation across space and time—in China, the ancient Roman Empire, and contemporary Europe. He identified not only structural features (e.g., hierarchy of offices, written files, salary), but also governing precepts (e.g., precision, obedience, secrecy), and intended outcomes (e.g., goal-fulfillment, impartiality). He brought together analysis of the social basis of bureaucracy (e.g., development of the rule of law), the functioning of bureaucratic organizations (e.g., its legitimation as well as potential dysfunctions associated with tenure in office), and the position and work of bureaucrats or administrators in them (Bendix, 1978). Bureaucracy also appeared in different roles in his theorizing, sometimes as the effect of sociohistorical processes (e.g., mass democracy) and sometimes as a mechanism driving those processes (e.g., an engine of rationalization). The result was a concept that came to organization and management studies as multidimensional (structural, behavioral, cultural), multifaceted (work control, labor conditions, personal conduct, interpersonal relations), and multilayered (sociohistorical, organizational, occupational).

As the study of bureaucracy developed in our field, scholars responded to this complexity in different ways. Specifically, as noted above, our review

BOX 1

Weber's List of Characteristics of Bureaucratic Administrative Staff in a Legal-Authority Regime

Source: Weber, 1921/1978: 221–221.

The purest type of exercise of legal authority is that which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff. Only the supreme chief of the organization occupies his position of dominance (*Herrenstellung*) by virtue of appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession. But even his authority consists in a sphere of legal “competence.” The whole administrative staff under the supreme authority then consists, in the purest type, of individual officials (constituting a “monocracy” as opposed to the “collegial” type, which will be discussed below) who are appointed and function according to the following criteria:

- (1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.
- (2) They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
- (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.
- (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection.
- (5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are *appointed*, not elected.
- (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have a right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's social status may be taken into account.
- (7) The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent.
- (8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of “promotion” according to seniority or to achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors.
- (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.
- (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

This type of organization is in principle applicable with equal facility to a wide variety of different fields. It may be applied in profit-making business or in charitable organizations, or in any number of other types of private enterprises serving ideal or material ends. It is equally applicable to political and to hierocratic organizations. With the varying degrees of approximation to a pure type, its historical existence can be demonstrated in all these fields.

found three perspectives that emerged more or less successively over time and that have persisted in parallel. In the first, bureaucracy appears as the expression of an organizing principle, with variants focusing respectively on instrumental rationality, value rationality, and domination. In the second, it appears as the paradigmatic form of modern organization in both its formal and informal dimensions, with one variant focusing on its dysfunctions, and the other seeing more positive potential. In a third, bureaucracy is seen as one type of organization structure among others. Table 1 provides an overview.

In the next three sections, we present each perspective in turn. The distinction among these perspectives is analytical: some studies combine two or more. For the main part, however, research in each of the perspectives has paid little attention to work in the others. By making these differences explicit, our review makes it possible to read the literature in a more informed way and dispel some of the confusion around the concept. Echoing the lesson of the parable of the blind men and the elephant, we argue that each offers valuable insights, and that our scholarship would be stronger if we exploited their complementarities.

BUREAUCRACY AS THE EXPRESSION OF AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE

The first perspective sees the bureaucratic form of organization as the expression of a distinctive organizing principle. Here, the specific organizational features listed by Weber are secondary—they are merely contingent expressions of that principle. The principle itself has been understood in three different ways, leading to three variants of this perspective. The first and most widely adopted variant takes rationalization, specifically instrumental and formal rationality, as the central characteristic that both underpins modern bureaucratic administration and differentiates it from pre-modern and pre-capitalist counterparts. The second contests the first's exclusive focus on instrumental and formal rationality, and argues that in Weber's account, as in real bureaucracies, value-rationality plays a critical—albeit supporting—role. Here, bureaucracy is characterized by a distinctive professional comportment and ethos, one that is underpinned by values of impartiality and impersonality in the performance of one's duties. The third sees bureaucracy as a system of domination legitimized by appeals to instrumental rationality.

BOX 2

Weber's List of Characteristics of Modern Bureaucracy

(Source: Weber, 1921/1978: 956–958)

Modern officialdom functions in the following manner:

I. There is the principle of official *jurisdictional areas*, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations. This means:

(1) The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are assigned as official duties.

(2) The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials.

(3) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the exercise of the corresponding rights; only persons who qualify under general rules are employed.

II. The principles of *office hierarchy* and of channels of appeal (*Instanzenzug*) stipulate a clearly established system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing, in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office to the corresponding superior authority. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy is *monocratically* organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called “private” or “public.” (...)

III. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (the “files”), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and upon a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials working in an agency along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files makes up a *bureau* (in private enterprises often called the “counting house,” *Kontor*). (...)

IV. Office management, at least all specialized office management—and such management is distinctly modern—usually presupposes thorough training in a field of specialization. This, too, holds increasingly for the modern executive and employee of a private enterprise, just as it does for the state officials.

V. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the *full working capacity* of the official, irrespective of the fact that the length of his obligatory working hours in the bureau may be limited. In the normal case, this too is only the product of a long development, in the public as well as in the private office. Formerly the normal state of affairs was the reverse: Official business was discharged as a secondary activity.

VI. The management of the office follows *general rules*, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical expertise which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, administrative or business management. (...)

This Principle perspective is common in the wider field of social theory (e.g., Bauman, 1988; Giddens, 1971). In addition, as we will show in a later section, it is more common today in European than in U.S. management journals, possibly because organization studies in Europe has preserved stronger ties with that wider field. In the sections below, we identify the key ideas in each variant in turn.

Bureaucracy as Instrumental Rationality

Weber (1921/1978: 698) saw capitalism and bureaucracy as the “two great rationalizing forces,” and rationalization itself as the defining feature of modernity (Collins, 1988).² Specifically, he saw bureaucracy as a

way of organizing that blossoms when “instrumental” rationality is established as the modal form of social action in organizations and in economic transactions. Instrumental rationality refers to the pursuit of given goals via the most efficient means available. Where instrumental rationality prevails, the ends of action are given and not themselves under discussion. In contrast, value-rational action is based on commitment to some ultimate value and involves conscious deliberation on the concrete meaning to be attributed that value in the given circumstances. These two rationality-based types of action can be contrasted with affectual action, based on emotion, and traditionalistic action, based on habit and respect for customs (Weber, 1921/1978).

² Rationalization has, of course, been studied in relation to many spheres of life beyond administration—such as the arts (Weber, 1958), religion (Kalberg, 1990), and law (Jennings, Schulz, Patient, Gravel, & Yuan, 2005)—and connected to various carriers besides bureaucracy, such as

asceticism (Kieser, 1987), accounting tools (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991) and even the operating principles of McDonalds (Ritzer, 1993).

TABLE 1
Three Perspectives on Bureaucracy

	Perspective 1: Bureaucracy as a Principle			Perspective 2: Bureaucracy as a Paradigm		Perspective 3: Bureaucracy as a Type
	1.1: Bureaucracy as Instrumental Rationality	1.2: Bureaucracy as Value Rationality	1.3: Bureaucracy as Domination	2.1: Bureaucracy as a Dysfunctional Paradigm	2.2: Bureaucracy as a Flexible Paradigm	
Conceptualization of bureaucracy	Bureaucracy broadly defined according to its premises beyond specific features			Bureaucracy understood holistically as the paradigm of modern organization		Bureaucracy defined through fixed features in counterpoint to other types
Analytical foci of research	The historical origins, social foundations, and development of bureaucracy			The functioning of bureaucracy in both its formal and informal dimensions		Bureaucracy compared to other types of organization for different purposes
Normative stance toward bureaucracy	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Negative	Positive	Neutral
Keywords associated with bureaucracy	Rationalization, instrumental, legal, formal rationality	Values, ethos, conduct, impartiality, goal-achievement	Power, authority, control, hierarchy	Goal-displacement, rigidity, conformism, parochialism,	Dynamic, Hybrid, Enabling, Representative	New forms, flexibility, rapid environment, mechanistic vs. organic
Exemplary Work	Soemardjan, 1957; Brown, 1978; Collins, 1988; Adler, 2005; Haveman, Rao, & Parachuri, 2007; Hwang & Powell, 2009	Hilbert, 1987; Du Gay, 2000; Pearce et al., 2000; McDonnell, 2017; Lopdrup-Hjorth & Roelsgaard Obling, 2019	Langton, 1984; Burawoy, 1979; Nelson, 1993; Courpasson, 2000; Clegg, 2012	Merton, 1940; Crozier, 1964; March & Simon, 1958; Hodson et al., 2013	Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1956; Adler & Borys, 1996; Ashcraft, 2001; Briscoe, 2007; Canales, 2013	Burns & Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; Pugh et al., 1969; Child, 1972; Mintzberg, 1979; Heckscher, 1994; Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010;

Weber portrayed bureaucracy as a form of organization based on instrumental rationality in a context of legally legitimated authority.³ Deliberation on the

³ Reliance on law is important in Weber's account because his discussions of bureaucracy were primarily in the context of government agencies, where laws often codify the agency's goals, and sometimes codify procedures for achieving those goals that reflect the legislature's intent. The term legal-rational might make us wonder whether the concept of bureaucracy is relevant for private-sector business organizations. Weber and subsequent scholarship have answered this in the affirmative, because business organizations too rely on laws—in particular, the legal authority invested in the board and CEO to set goals, as well as the firm's own private laws in the form of rules and procedures that codify prescribed ways of achieving those goals. The diffusion of bureaucracy from the public to the private sector—and back again—as well as the diffusion across the private sector have been the object of a rich

ends of action is here reserved for actors at the top of the hierarchy of authority: subordinates take those ends as given by authoritative command, and they understand their task as pursuing the most efficient way of realizing those ends. By contrast, in charismatic organizations, authority is legitimized by appeals to affectual commitments to an inspiring leader and their vision. In traditionalistic organizations, authority is legitimized by sacred customs. In collegial organizations, authority is diffuse, and action is based on a common value-rational commitment to

body of scholarship. These works have identified various vectors of diffusion, including actors such as industrial engineers (Shenhav, 1995), personnel experts (Dobbin & Kelly, 2007), and consultants (Wright, Sturdy, & Wylie, 2012), as well as management tools such as performance measurement (Townley, Cooper, & Oakes, 2003) and process methodologies (Adler, 2005; Adler & Kwon, 2013).

some shared ideals (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979; Satow, 1975). The last of these is not, in Weber's view, a scalable form of organization, because it grants no-one command capacity (Nass, 1986). These are all ideal types: real-world organizations exhibit a mix of all of them, just as the four types of social action are typically intermingled in real-world interactions.

Weber's contrast of instrumental and value rationality parallels his distinction between formal and substantive rationality. Formal rationality is operative where the procedure for making the decision is rational by virtue of its reliance on formal rules and calculation. Substantive rationality is a function of the content of the decision: it is judged rational insofar as it supports some higher-order goal (Albrow, 1970; Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). In its most advanced form, instrumentally rational bureaucracy embodies both legal and formal rationality (Kalberg, 1980).

Bureaucracy as the organizational form stemming from instrumental rationality has continued as a theme in the broader social sciences. We see it in investigations of social movements (Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000), of the form of nation-states (Silberman, 1993), and of cross-national bodies (Deflem, 2000). We see it in studies of modernization (Weiker, 1968), and industrialization (Walton, 1987), and it figures in research on the similarities and differences between capitalism and socialism (Kocka, 1981; Stark, 1989). Some of this work has touched on organizational matters, such as in the program advanced by John Meyer and colleagues on world society, which, among other themes, examined the sociocultural processes underpinning the diffusion of rationalized organizational forms (Bromley & Meyer, 2015; Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Meyer, Krücken, & Drori, 2009).

In organization studies, scholars have examined bureaucratic rationalization in public organizations (e.g., Roy, 1981) and in specific organizations and industries (e.g., Adler, 2006; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996). Langton (1984), for example, examined the bureaucratization of the British pottery industry during the industrial revolution. He analyzed the emergence of specialized tasks and career paths, the formalization of work processes and work-time norms, and the concomitant decline of the guild-based, traditionalistic spirit. Other scholars have studied the bureaucratization of employment relations (Baron, Jennings, & Dobbin, 1988; Jacoby, 1985), financial accountability (Hwang & Powell, 2009), decision-making (Espeland, 2000; Piiparinen, 2008), staffing (Hensby, Sibthorpe, & Driver, 2012), roles (Räisänen & Linde, 2004), and general administrative operations (Bordua & Reiss, 1966). Bureaucratic

rationalization has also been a key object of studies in research on professions such as accounting, law, and medicine (Adler, Kwon, & Heckscher, 2008; Berg, 1997; Brivot, 2011; Eckberg, 1987; Freidson, 1984; Montagna, 1968; Powell, Brock, & Hinings, 1999; Racko, 2017; Scott, 1965), and occupations such as software development (Adler, McGarry, Irion-Talbot, & Binney, 2005; Greenbaum, 1979).

Scholars who see bureaucracy as rationalization have also explored the way instrumental rationality interacts with other forms of social action and conditions, sometimes generating "hybrid" forms of bureaucracy (e.g., Delany, 1963; Smith, 1957). Espeland (2000), for example, studied how a marginal group of bureaucrats from a U.S. federal agency pursued a form of rationality premised on the balancing of multiple interests—rather than the procedural implementation of government directives—and how their success generated an organization with a surprisingly democratic decision-making process. Noteworthy here is early organizational research that focused on the foundations and variation of (Weberian) bureaucracy across sociocultural contexts (e.g., Ehrmann, 1961; Katz & Eisenstadt, 1960; Liu, 1959; Soemardjan, 1957; Weiker, 1968). For example, in a study of the Turkish coal industry, Presthus (1961) showed how instrumental rationality combined with traditionalistic values created a "welfare bureaucracy" that balanced Weberian bureaucracy's principles of competence and impartiality with welfare principles of cooperation and social benefits.

Bureaucracy as Value Rationality

The second variant of the Principle perspective brings important nuances to the first: while bureaucracy relies on instrumental rationality, a well-functioning bureaucracy also relies on a distinctive comportment that embodies a certain value rationality (Du Gay, 2000, 2005). To occupy a bureaucratic office is to assume responsibilities that override other social and personal commitments (McDonnell, 2020). The modern bureaucrat, Weber (1994: 160) wrote:

takes pride in preserving his [*sic*] impartiality, overcoming his own inclinations and opinions, so as to execute in a conscientious and meaningful way what is required of him by the general definition of his duties or by some particular instruction, even—and particularly—when they do not coincide with his own political views.

While bureaucrats—and, by extension, anyone performing a formal role in a bureaucratic organization—function under a general norm of instrumental

rationality, they do not relinquish their commitment to value and substantive rationality expressed in this ethos. Indeed, they should appeal decisions when these seem incorrect or at variance with the mission of their office or the wider organization. However, their action is circumscribed by a structure based on instrumental and formal rationality, such that if their appeal is rejected, they are legally and ethically bound to implement the decision (or resign) (Weber, 1921/1978).

When Weber was writing in the early 20th century, this ethos represented an emerging accomplishment. A century later, this aspect of bureaucracy appears taken for granted as the appropriate conduct in the workplace—so much so that in everyday (as distinct from the theoretical) language, we might describe this ethos simply as “professionalism,” which the U.S. Department of Labor (n.d.) has defined as “conducting oneself with responsibility, integrity, accountability, and excellence.” In reality, of course, such professionalism is an ideal, realized only partly in many organizations where favoritism and discrimination, personal appropriation of office prerequisites, and other forms of “misconduct” abound (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010; Vaughan, 1999).

This variant highlights the emancipatory potential of the bureaucratic values of meritocracy, universalism, and neutrality, which contrast so strongly with traditionalistic patronage ties (Olsen, 2006; Tribe, 2019) and the arbitrary character of authority in charismatic orders (Adair-Toteff, 2014). The latter are still found in personnel practices, often undermining employee trust and commitment (Pearce, Branyiczki, & Bigley, 2000). Debureaucratizing efforts in the name of agility and market responsiveness often lead to scandalous breakdowns—breakdowns that remind us that the benefits of the meritocratic and universalistic values of bureaucracy should not be taken for granted (Du Gay, 2017).

As in the other two variants of this perspective, here the structural features listed by Weber (Boxes 1 and 2) are secondary: the values and ideals of bureaucracy—typically embodied by those working in a bureaucracy as a *Lebensführung* (“life conduct”)—are primary. Scholars working in this variant see the formal structures typically associated with bureaucracy as important only insofar as they support the development of a distinctive compartment: a bureaucratic ethos. They have pointed out that Weber devoted far more space to the latter than to the former (Du Gay, 2000; McDonnell, 2017). This variant sees Weber as a historical anthropologist concerned with the development of a distinctive form of life and of character—a

concern most clear in his essays on vocation (Byrkjeflot & Du Gay, 2012; du Gay, 2018; Hennis, 1983; Thomas, 1998; Tribe, 2007). It is also an emic viewpoint for many people working in public organizations, where expertise, professional discretion, and a sense of calling are often highly valued.⁴ While this viewpoint is quite far from many characterizations of modern bureaucracies—especially those that highlight rigid, “Taylorist” standardization and separation between conception and execution—it helps make sense of cases where bureaucracy coexists with a shared sense of commitment and purpose (Adler, 2006; Ritz, Brewer, & Neumann, 2016).

Approaching bureaucracy in this more positive light, scholars in this variant typically seek to understand the (contextual) conditions for the emergence and effectiveness of the bureaucratic ethos. For example, early research explored how bureaucratic values develop and square with nonbureaucratic ones (e.g., religious morality) (Denhardt, 1968; Liu, 1959). More recently, research has examined the importance of behavioral mechanisms, such as the development and maintenance of a sense of duty (du Gay & Pedersen, 2020), and the role of structural elements such as career systems (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017). In a study of state organization in developing countries, McDonnell (2017) explored the social and cultural conditions that fostered the bureaucratic ethos of impartial and effective administration within a wider patrimonial context.

Beyond their effort to identify mechanisms and patterns, scholars in this variant have engaged in the defense of government bureaucracy against “neoliberal” reforms. From this perspective, “new public management” and similar reforms are typically seen as undermining the ethos that is critical to the effective functioning of a modern state bureaucracy (Clegg et al., 2011; Lopdrup-Hjorth & Obling, 2019; Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014; Olsen, 2008; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011). Across public and private sectors, authors have discussed the

⁴ Weber understood professional expertise as a fundamental aspect of bureaucracy equating higher hierarchical standing with superior knowledge and competence (see, e.g., Toren, 1976). Yet, this link progressively disappeared in the debate on bureaucracy. This seems partially due to the differentiation between professional and bureaucratic forms of organization prevalent in the United States and United Kingdom (see Meyer, 1995). It also reflects Parsons’s famous critique of Weber, which contested the link between expertise and authority (for an analysis and critique, see Nass, 1986).

diffusion of market or “enterprising” principles that fuel an antibureaucratic spirit (du Gay & Salaman, 1992; Salaman & Storey, 2008; Sturdy & Wright, 2008) and erode some of the safeguards that bureaucracy can provide (Russell & McCabe, 2015).

A focus on rationality as highlighted by this variant and the previous one helps us put in perspective some important debates about the darker sides of bureaucracy. For example, some critics of modernity have interpreted as prototypically bureaucratic the Nazis’ habit of meticulous record-keeping in their management of the program of extermination of Jews, homosexuals, and other “undesirables” (Bauman, 2000). However, to qualify that administration as bureaucratic is to ignore the Weberian ideal type’s grounding in its distinctive ethos of meritocracy, universalism, and neutrality (Clegg, 2006; Du Gay, 2000). The Nazi regime is better understood as darkly charismatic: the Nazis dismantled and politicized the public administration, leading to ill-defined offices and departments. Officials paid little heed to their superiors’ orders, doing instead whatever they thought it would take to please the *Führer* (Gerth, 1940; Kershaw, 1987, 1993).

Bureaucracy as Domination

In the third variant of the Principle perspective, the focus is on the fundamental power relation that undergirds—and is reproduced by—bureaucracy. This broadens the variety of organizational forms that count as bureaucratic beyond the ideal-typical form based on comprehensive instrumental rationality, to include forms where bureaucracy appears as the administrative arm of a traditionalistic or charismatic leader (Albrow, 1970; Constan, 1958).

In both the narrower and broader sense, bureaucracy is a means of domination—in Weber’s German term, *Herrschaft*, literally rulership or domination by the master (see Weber, 2019: 417–472). Indeed, while Weber saw modern bureaucracy as a form of organization legitimated by appeals to instrumental rationality, this rationality was, in his view, merely the means by which the ruler at the head of the organization could guarantee that their orders were reliably executed.⁵ He wrote: “Without exception, every

sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of domination. [...] [T]he structure of domination and its unfolding is decisive in determining the form of social action and its orientation towards a ‘goal’” (Weber, 1968: 941). Authors such as Bendix (1956, 1978) did much to bring domination into focus (see also Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005; Perrow, 1986), but it was an uphill battle against the legacy left by the first English translations of Weber, such as that by Parsons (Weber, 1947), where *Herrschaft* was translated as authority or leadership, thus downplaying its power dimension (Cohen, Hazelrigg, & Pope, 1975).

Scholars starting from domination have sought to synthesize Weber with other theories of power and politics, such as those advanced by Michels (e.g., Courpasson & Clegg, 2006), Tocqueville (e.g., Clegg & Courpasson, 2004), or Foucault (e.g., Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel, 1998). This leads them to contrast the monocratic hierarchy of bureaucracy with democratic and polyarchic forms of organization (Courpasson & Clegg, 2012; Courpasson & Dany, 2003). This angle of attack has been popular among scholars working in the critical management studies tradition (Alvesson, Bridgman, & Willmott, 2009).

An understanding of bureaucracy as domination underpins research on the tension between bureaucracy and individual or collective self-expression and autonomy. Exemplary here is the body of scholarship studying bureaucracy as a vehicle for the “proletarianization” of professionals and as a threat to the autonomy of professional decision-making (e.g., Ben-David, 1958; Daniels, 1969; Freidson, 1984; Hall, 1968; Larson, 1977; Mills, 2002).⁶ Both the effect of

opportunism, and the mere absence of alternatives. Compliance is somewhat more reliable when based on material interests (such as in the agency theory’s image of the organization) and idealistic motives such as shared goals (value rationality). The most reliable compliance, he argued, arises when the subordinate sees the orders themselves as legitimate. Weber then identified three bases of such legitimacy—instrumental or rational legality, tradition, and charisma. Of these three, Weber argued that the instrumental or formal legal form is the most advanced, most flexible, and most effective. However, it is still a form of domination.

⁶ This was mainly an Anglo-American concern. Whereas in much of the rest of the world, professionals in fields such as medicine and law are often employed by the government, in the United States and United Kingdom they were traditionally more often in “private practices”

⁵ In the third chapter of *Economy and Society* Vol. I, Weber (1921/1978) examined how rulers ensure reliable domination over their subjects; that is, how they ensure that their subordinates obey their orders. As Weber presented the matter, people comply with orders for various reasons. Some reasons render compliance unreliable: here, Weber mentioned simulated and hypocritical obedience,

the incorporation of professionals into bureaucratic organizations and the infusion of bureaucracy into professional organizations have been the object of substantial literature. However, the related empirical research has yielded mixed results (e.g., Robertson & Swan, 2004). In some studies, bureaucratization has been found to erode autonomy and shift control to managers (e.g., Huising, 2014), but other studies have found that professionals are able to retain control in the face of bureaucratization and even enhance their power in this context (e.g., Brivot, 2011; Vaast, 2007).

The recognition of bureaucracy as domination has also served as a platform to examine changes in bureaucracy's structural expression, usually coupled with skepticism toward claims that its underlying substance has been superseded (Courpasson & Reed, 2004). For these authors, decentralized project structures (Clegg & Courpasson, 2004), empowerment programs (Hales, 2002), cultural forms of control (Kärreman & Alvesson, 2004), and the shift toward casual or temporary contracts (Morris, Farrell, & Reed, 2016) do not displace bureaucracy. Rather, they are refinements that give bureaucracy a "soft," "light," or "neo" appearance (e.g., Courpasson, 2000; Hales, 2002; Sturdy, Wright, & Wylie, 2015), while leaving untouched its core as domination. Indeed, starting from domination helps bring into focus bureaucracy's plasticity and its ability to digest resistance (Courpasson, 2011). Viewed through these lenses, many apparently antibureaucratic mechanisms—such as project management (Hodgson, 2004), knowledge management (Kamoche & Maguire, 2011), communities of practice (Swan, Scarbrough, & Ziebro, 2016), or change programs (Sturdy, Wright, & Wylie, 2016)—are arguably better understood as extensions and adaptations of bureaucracy, making it more flexible and collaborative as a form of domination (Clegg, 2012; Clegg et al., 2011; Hassard, Morris, & McCann, 2012).

BUREAUCRACY AS THE PARADIGMATIC FORM OF ORGANIZATION

By the middle of the 20th century in the United States, with the ascendancy of large-scale business and the growing importance of the public sector, bureaucracy had become ubiquitous as a standard organizational template—the paradigmatic form of organization (Chandler, 1977; Jacoby, 1985; Meyer,

1995).⁷ With this institutionalization of bureaucracy as the model for larger formal organizations, researchers' attention was drawn from bureaucracy's immanent principles to its concrete reality. Partly inspired by the "discovery" of informal organization by Barnard (1938) and the Hawthorne studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939), the focus of research shifted from the exploration of the principles underlying bureaucracy to empirical studies of bureaucracy in both its formal and informal aspects (for a conceptual discussion, see Selznick, 1943).

This perspective comes in two variants. The first takes bureaucracy as a more or less unitary phenomenon and seeks to understand its intrinsic failure modes. The second adopts a more expansive approach and aims to identify how the formal dimension of bureaucracy can be associated with a more congenial informal organization, generating more positive outcomes. We review these variants in turn.

Bureaucracy as a Dysfunctional Organizational Paradigm

The hallmark of this first variant is an understanding of bureaucracy as an inherently dysfunctional form of organization, echoing the pejorative, colloquial view. Weber was far from deaf to the common attacks against bureaucracy: he described the bureaucratization of social order as "the polar night of icy darkness" (Weber, 1994: xvi). While this negative view has accompanied the concept from its pre-Weberian origins (Albrow, 1970; Starbuck, 2005), the work in this category is distinguished by its effort to characterize more specifically bureaucracy's dysfunctions and theorize their causes.

Robert Merton was among the first researchers to take up bureaucracy's dysfunctions from a theoretical perspective. His social-psychological approach highlights the power of bureaucratic settings in encouraging an overconformist type of "bureaucratic personality" (Merton, 1940). Some of Merton's mentees pointed to related failings of prototypical bureaucratic organizations—for example, ritualism and resistance to change (Blau, 1963), conflict between

and enjoyed considerable freedom from hierarchical constraints in their daily decision-making (Freidson, 1970).

⁷ Bureaucracy had been a template for organizing since much earlier days in Europe where public bureaucratic functionaries can be traced back centuries; administrative centralization and bureaucratization were constitutive of the nation states; industry administration followed the model of public bureaucracy; and most professional groups emerged and worked under public bureaucracy's jurisdiction (for a comparison between the United States and Continental Europe, see Meyer, 1995).

management and workers (Gouldner, 1954), institutionalization of bureaucratic mechanisms beyond their technical value (Selznick, 1980)—even though they were more agnostic regarding the necessary link between bureaucracy and dysfunction (see discussion below).

This pessimistic perspective also developed in a distinct stream of scholarship that started with Herbert Simon (1947) and extends through works such as March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963) and studies such as Allison's (1971) classic book on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here, the focus is on decision-making, and the theory mobilizes social-psychological insights to identify how decision-making in bureaucracies escapes the strictures of instrumental rationality and is shaped by psychological processes such as satisficing and political processes including interdepartmental rivalry.

With a more sociological focus, Crozier (1964) studied a clerical agency and an industrial monopoly, and documented the frustrations, power games, and alienation that color work life in those bureaucratic workplaces. He analyzed the social basis and political dynamics that blocked the bureaucratic organization's ability to "correct its behavior by learning from its errors" (Crozier, 1964: 187). His research traced bureaucracy's failings to contextual and interactional causes, rather than structural features.

Among bureaucracy's many purported dysfunctions, "alienation" figured prominently in earlier scholarship (e.g., Miller, 1967), and, as the study of organizations migrated from sociology to management departments, attention shifted and broadened to include related variables such as work satisfaction (Snizek & Bullard, 1983). Bureaucracy's centralization of decision-making and standardization of work practices were often said to be intrinsically disempowering (e.g., Aiken & Hage, 1966; Hoy, Blazovsky, & Newland, 1983; Kohn, 1989). We should note, however, that as empirical research on this theme progressed, the causal link between bureaucracy and these outcomes became less clear, particularly when bureaucracy as the independent variable is understood in purely structural terms. Kohn (1976) found that higher levels of bureaucratization, measured by the number of layers of hierarchy, correlated with *lower* levels on the three of the four main dimensions of alienation—experienced powerlessness, self-estrangement, and normlessness (but higher levels of cultural estrangement). In addition, beyond alienation, Kohn (1989) showed that higher degrees of such bureaucratization predict greater, not less,

self-directedness and ideational flexibility. Shantz et al. (2015) found that alienation was unrelated to decision-making autonomy and driven instead mainly by task variety and task identity.

Finally, several scholars have recently argued that "Weberian" bureaucracy is empirically less common than its "Kafkaesque" cousin, where power games, misbehavior, and rule-breaking are not deviations or anomalies but the norm (Hodson, Martin, Lopez, & Roscigno, 2013; McCabe, 2014; Nisar & Masood, 2020). Integrating previous studies on the dysfunctional features of bureaucracy—such as the classic work of Jackall (1988)—Hodson et al. (2013) argued that as bureaucracy became the hegemonic form of organization over the past century, formal rules became façades hiding financial wrongdoing, environmental destruction, and social domination.

Bureaucracy as a Flexible Organizational Paradigm

In contrast to the pessimistic portraits offered in the variant just discussed, some scholars have argued that bureaucratic structures can be associated with other kinds of informal social patterns, and that such configurations could yield far more positive outcomes. Two main strands of scholarship contributed to this variant of the Paradigm perspective. We call them strands rather than variants because they are differentiated more by research focus than by a distinctive conceptualization and analytical project.

The first of these strands is exemplified by the work of two of Merton's mentees—Alvin Gouldner and Peter Blau—who examined daily work and labor relations in bureaucratic organizations (see review by Haveman, 2010). Gouldner (1954) identified three patterns of bureaucracy—punishment-centered, mock, and representative—in the same organization. The first two represented relatively dysfunctional forms, while the last was, in his view, a more emancipatory one. He showed that bureaucratic rules are sometimes a disciplinary means of domination by management and the source of grievances by workers (punishment-centered); and they are sometimes announced but ignored (mock); however, they sometimes embody an effective solution, mutually agreed-upon between managers and workers, to the tasks at hand (representative).

Similarly, Blau (1963) contrasted two government departments that were equally bureaucratic in their formal structuring, one of which demonstrated the expected dysfunctions, while the other was remarkably competent, dynamic, and adaptive. He identified five

prerequisites for the latter kind: employment security, a professional orientation toward the performance of duties, established work groups that command the allegiance of their members, the absence of basic conflict between work group and management, and organizational needs that are experienced as disturbing. Contrasting patterns of workplace informal relations yielded different performance outcomes across organizations whose formal structures were equally bureaucratic.

Several other scholars followed this path, arguing that the formal structure of bureaucracy could be associated with specific patterns of informal relations to generate more positive outcomes. For example, Adler (1999) and Adler and Borys (1996) contrasted two types of bureaucracy based on whether formal features of bureaucracy were associated with enabling or coercive social relations. Here, the formal structure of bureaucracy was presented as an organizing technology—a technology that, like material technologies, can be designed and implemented either to reduce managers' reliance on employees' skills and initiative or to leverage them. Cardinal et al. (2017) reviewed research making this kind of distinction among systems of control and confirmed its explanatory value. Echoing a comparable concern for empowerment and participatory goals, Ashcraft (2001) empirically demonstrated how a feminist bureaucracy was able to leverage the formal apparatus of bureaucracy toward more collectivist ideals typical of feminist organizations. Similarly, Gittell and Douglass (2012) conceptualized what they called a “relational bureaucracy” as a “hybrid” form in which the formal structure of bureaucracy is infused with positive relational norms.

The second strand in this variant shows that bureaucracy does not always and everywhere lead to dysfunction because people, in their everyday work, deploy bureaucratic structures in ways that prevent that outcome. For example, in an early study, Landsberger (1961) discovered that cross-functional interactions are surprisingly frequent in ostensibly “siloes” bureaucratic organization and often reflect a collective effort to improve organizational performance rather than power games. More recently, Canales (2013) showed that some loan officers did not allow formal rules to entirely displace discretion in their decision-making and were able to find a productive balance between standardization and flexibility. Similarly, several studies have suggested that given an appropriate type of informal organization, the formal structure of bureaucracy could support, or at least not impede, flexibility or

innovation in contexts such as lean manufacturing (Adler, 1993; Adler et al., 1999), fire-fighting (Bigley & Roberts, 2001), trauma teams (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006), and healthcare delivery (Briscoe, 2007). Further, in a recent chapter of the long-standing debate of professional autonomy and bureaucracy, Bechky and Chung (2018) suggested a model of pragmatic accommodation—instead of struggle over control—in which occupational groups make bureaucracy work for them.

BUREAUCRACY AS ONE TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AMONG OTHERS

The third perspective extends the discussion of varieties of bureaucracy by taking into consideration a wider range of types of organization. This work is premised on two ideas: first, bureaucracy is just one type of organization among others; and second, the relative performance of each type depends on contingent factors. The key insight driving this perspective is that factors that are beyond the organization's control—“contingencies” such as the nature of the competitive environment, the available technology or workforce, and the strategic choices and task assignments decided at a higher hierarchical level—influence the relative performance potentials of the various possible types of organization. Debates over Weber and alternative interpretations become less relevant here, as the focus shifts to identifying alternatives to bureaucracy and conditions in which they might prove superior.

This perspective found great resonance as the center of gravity of organizational research shifted from sociology departments to business schools (Hinings, 1988). Here, the attention of scholars tended naturally toward finer-grained differentiations across alternative ways of organizing and their relative advantages in different settings. We found three strands of research in this contingency-theoretic perspective.

The first strand emerged in field research by Burns and Stalker (1961), and was then further theorized by scholars such as Thompson (1967), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), Woodward (1970), and Galbraith (1977), and extended by scholars such as Miles and Snow (1978) and Burton and Obel (2006). Burns and Stalker's (1961) book, *The Management of Innovation*, remains the foundational reference for this body of work. This study famously contrasted “mechanistic” and “organic” types of organization, with the former equated to bureaucracy. Here, we see two competing types of organization, each characterized by

distinctive formal and informal features (see Burns & Stalker, 1961).

In Burns and Stalker's (1961) account, the formal structure of mechanistic or bureaucratic organizations is characterized by narrow specialization, strictly defined responsibilities assigned to individuals, and extensive hierarchical, top-down control. Their informal organization is such that strategic knowledge is restricted to top executives and horizontal interactions are limited. Their norms privilege obedience, and attention is focused on intraorganizational rather than external issues. Conversely, organic organizations are characterized by a more spontaneous structuring of activities, less narrowly defined task boundaries, diffuse responsibilities, and norms that encourage both cosmopolitan externally facing relations and collegial intraorganizational relations.

Critically, Burns and Stalker (1961) argued that economic performance would call for a more mechanistic or a more organic type of organization depending on the external circumstances, most notably on the demand for innovation and change. Woodward (1970) offered some survey-based support for this basic argument, showing that mechanistic bureaucracy was more common in the mass-production industry, and that both small-scale unit-production and continuous-production systems typically adopted a more organic form. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) argued, similarly, that more predictable contexts called for a more bureaucratic type of organization, and that such organizations should, as a result, recruit employees who will be satisfied working in such regimented jobs. In parallel, a sizeable body of research has confirmed the importance of contingencies in explaining these types in terms of differential effects on efficiency, innovation, and job satisfaction (for a review, see Kessler, Nixon, & Nord, 2017).⁸

⁸ Critics of contingency theory have argued that the technical-economic efficiency argument for the mechanistic or bureaucratic type missed (and thus served as an apologia for) the political nature of the organization design choices made by senior executives (Child, 1972). One strand of criticism contributed to the Type perspective, framing bureaucracy as just one form of control over labor, and contrasting bureaucratic with "simple," "technical," and "normative" control regimes (Edwards, 1979; Kunda, 2009). Another strand argued that contingency theory overlooked the institutional conformance pressures that often drove the diffusion of this form of organization regardless of its efficiency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Whereas this first strand retains something of Weber's balanced focus on the structural and informal aspects of bureaucracy, the second strand focuses on the former aspect. Understood in this more parsimonious manner—as the length of vertical chains of hierarchical control, the extent of specialization of subunits and individuals, the degree of standardization and formalization of working procedures, etc.—bureaucracy is more easily measured and compared (see Donaldson & Luo, 2014; Walton, 2005). Udy (1958) was an early proponent of this shift: he examined a sample of 150 production organizations across the world to ascertain the extent to which elements of Weber's ideal type were correlated—specifically, hierarchical authority structure, an administrative staff, and differential rewards according to office. Similarly, Hall (1962) measured different levels of bureaucracy by comparing structural variation across departments and hierarchical layers, paying less attention to the "informal, or unofficial work arrangements which are at variance with the officially prescribed structure."

The U.K.-based Aston Group took this approach further in scope and rigor, statistically validating their organization structure constructs via a survey of organizations in the English Midlands (for a review, see Donaldson & Luo, 2014). Donaldson and Luo (2014) differentiated "full" bureaucracy from cases where bureaucratic structuring characterized only the work process (in "workflow bureaucracies") or only the employment relations (in "personnel bureaucracies"), and mapped their prevalence and evolution across sectors (Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968). Hage and Aiken (1967) offered another influential model of this kind of work, though this was more focused on task-level and workforce characteristics (Donaldson, 2001). Mintzberg (1979) theorized a "professional" variety of bureaucracy in contrast to the "machine" variety. In the former, control over the work of specialized professionals relied on the standardization of their skills and not of their work processes (Mintzberg, 1979). These studies inspired a host of others exploring the connection between structural dimensions, their effects on organizational outcomes in different contexts, and related phenomena such as entrepreneurship, creativity (Hirst, Van Knippenberg, Chen, & Sacramento, 2011), learning (Bresman & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2013; Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010), and innovation (Damanpour, 1991, 1992).

This structure-oriented strand yielded, and continues to yield, interesting results—some of which contradict the reigning antibureaucracy animus. Damanpour's (1991) meta-analysis, for example,

shows that innovation initiation (as distinct from implementation) is more likely where roles and structures are more specialized; that formalization and centralization have no statistically significant effects on initiation; and that none of these structural variables is statistically significant in predicting the likelihood of radical versus incremental innovation. Bunderson and Boumgarden (2010) showed that even in smaller, self-managed teams, bureaucratic structuring—as defined by the Aston Group in terms of the structuring of activities (i.e., high levels of specialization, formalization, and hierarchy)—can help create an environment that supports learning and continuous improvement. Looming over the work of this strand is the nagging suspicion that their lack of attention to the informal aspects of organization leads to underspecification and to spurious correlations (McEvily, Soda, & Tortoriello, 2014). Causal identification has also been a challenge here.

A third strand explores in more depth the various alternatives to bureaucracy. Some of these new types, on closer examination, appear to be variants of bureaucracy (more on this below). Of the types that depart more substantially from bureaucracy, many echo the organic–mechanistic contrast, such as post-bureaucracy (Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994), heterarchy (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006; Stark, 2011), and “boss-less,” self-managed organizations (Billinger & Workiewicz, 2019; Choudhury, Crowston, Dahlander, Minervini, & Raghuram, 2020; Lee & Edmondson, 2017; Martela, 2019; Puranam & Håkonsson, 2015).

Contingency theory provides a (tacit or explicit) underpinning for all these strands. The emergence of these new forms—and the purported obsolescence of bureaucracy—is seen as a response to the growing external pressure for fluidity, dynamism, and innovativeness (e.g., Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). This idea is usually linked to observable changes in the structure of the economy (growing relevance of service or knowledge-intensive sectors), in technology (growth of the Internet and social media), in the workforce (new generation of millennials)—and to the often-asserted but largely unproven assumption that the rate of change today is much greater than that which prevailed 50 or 100 years ago (Eccles & Nohria, 1992).

THE COEXISTENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY OF PERSPECTIVES

A more quantitative assessment confirms that the three perspectives we have identified emerged more or less successively, but have continued in parallel.

The regional variation is also noteworthy (see Figures 3 and 4). In U.S. publications, while the Principle and Paradigm perspectives emerged in parallel, the more “sociological” Principle perspective never enjoyed much popularity and was soon overshadowed by the Paradigm perspective. Subsequently, we observe a pivot from the Paradigm perspective to the Type perspective, with interest in bureaucracy’s performance vis-à-vis alternative types peaking in the 1990s. In Europe, all the perspectives emerged in parallel. However, the Principle perspective enjoyed more recognition and became increasingly predominant, potentially due to the stronger link between organization studies and social theory in European research traditions. We also see in Europe a pivot from Paradigm to Type perspectives, but this took place later, in the 1990s to the 2000s.


Our review leads us to the conclusion that much of the confusion surrounding bureaucracy stems from differences in conceptualizing it. Each perspective helps illuminate different facets of this complex object: they are complementary, reflecting different scientific strategies associated with distinctive analytical foci (see Table 1). On the one hand, an expansive conceptualization of bureaucracy portrays its characteristics, starting with those identified by Weber, as evolving and historically situated manifestations of an underlying Principle or Paradigm. Here, the strategy is holistic and the goal is usually to examine bureaucracy’s underpinnings and functioning. Conversely, the strategy of authors adopting the Type perspective prioritizes conceptual parsimony and empirical testability. They focus on one or more of the characteristic features of the Weberian ideal-type and examine bureaucracy’s antecedents and outcomes.

These different strategies embody a common trade-off in organizational research between generality, accuracy, and simplicity (Weick, 1999). Testable constructs allow for more accurate analysis and greater simplicity and more comparable findings with fewer priors. On the other hand, a more holistic approach affords more generality and allows us to grasp the ways bureaucracy changes its appearance across contexts and the ways in which people repurpose it.

THREE PATHWAYS FOR RESEARCH

As noted in opening section of this article, there has been an overall decline in our field’s attention to bureaucracy relative to other themes (see Figure

FIGURE 3
Perspectives on Bureaucracy across Decades in (A) U.S. Journals and (B) European Journals




2). While some loss of “market share” is inevitable as a field evolves, it seems likely that a decline of this magnitude also reflects the popularity of the view that bureaucracy is a relic of an earlier industrial era that is not worth much of our research attention.

However, bureaucracy has not disappeared in the real world. Rather, what seems to have diminished is our ability to recognize the ways it continues, albeit in new guises, to scaffold work and organizations. In this section, we point to three factors curtailing our ability to grasp bureaucracy in its complexity, and we

then suggest three corresponding pathways that could reenergize its study. The pathways each hinge on putting the three perspectives in deeper dialogue with each other and with the broader universe of organizational scholarship.

To preview the paragraphs below, we note, first, that scholarship, especially in U.S. publications, has increasingly focused on the bureaucracy’s features while paying less attention to its social context (for some exceptions, see, on employment relations, Jacoby, 1985; on technology and social context, Kalinikos, 2004; on historical context, Meyer, 1995).

FIGURE 4
Volume of Papers on Bureaucracy across Decades in U.S. and European Journals



This has been a concern of some authors in the Principle perspective, and our first pathway aims to bring attention to how different contexts may generate different formal and informal patterns underpinning distinctive forms of bureaucracy.

Second, scholarship often privileges bureaucracy's formal structure and too rarely explores its interplay with the informal side—values, norms, behaviors, meanings, practices, etc. (for some exceptions, see, on practices, Ashcraft, 2001; on meaning, Hilbert, 1987; on behavior, Morand, 1995; Selznick, 1943). An appreciation for the informal side of bureaucracy is a hallmark of scholars in the Paradigm perspective. Building on that, our second pathway shows how broadening our view beyond formal structure may advance our understanding of bureaucracy.

Third, as our field has grown in numbers and density, we have seen a corollary increase in scholarly specialization, thus leading to an atomized view of bureaucracy. Research today is more likely to focus on just one element of bureaucracy's formal structure, such as hierarchy or rules. Our third pathway proposes to leverage the Type perspective's attention to interdependencies and configurations for more insight into the interacting effects of

bureaucracy's multiple elements and dimensions—how they complement or substitute for each other. Table 2 identifies some research directions in each of these three pathways: we discuss them below.

Bureaucracy in its Wider Context

Weber explored bureaucracy's different incarnations over time as well as the connections between its modern version and related developments in the wider society (Clegg, 1994; Kallinikos, 2004; Presthus, 1959). While early organization research within the Principle perspective embraced this problematic and explored bureaucracy comparatively and historically (Berger, 1957; Katz & Eisenstadt, 1960; Phelan, 1960; Presthus, 1961; Soemardjan, 1957), interest in such issues has waned in more recent decades, especially in the United States (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991). To be sure, open system traditions have focused on the context of organizations (Scott, 2014). Neo-institutionalism, in particular, has yielded rich insights into how bureaucracy as a cultural artifact diffuses across organizations as they come under various social pressures (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Yet, this work has mostly studied bureaucracy as a homogenous social-cultural template.

Renewing attention to the impact of differences in social and cultural context on the nature of bureaucracy would be fruitful because these differences are an important source of variation in ways of organizing. We suggest three research directions in this first pathway, addressing bureaucracy's variation across and embeddedness in (a) socio-cultural contexts and (b) historical periods, and (c) the role of bureaucracy in social and economic development.

First, consider what we can learn by studying variations in bureaucracy across sociocultural contexts. Meyer (1995), for example, argued that in the United States, bureaucracy was shaped by its early implementation in large corporations that operated in volatile markets in a cultural context that prioritized equality. This encouraged a form of bureaucracy that was flatter, less hierarchical, and more decentralized than in Europe. By contrast, in Europe, bureaucracy was shaped by its early implementation in government, and it diffused to industry in a more centralized, hierarchical, obedience- and loyalty-based form. Studies of French public organizations revealed the social-cultural roots of the bureaucratic dysfunctions often observed in that context: rigid operations traced back to state (hyper-) centralization, and social hierarchies in the workforce underpinned power conflicts (Crozier, 1964; d'Iribarne, 1994). Adler and colleagues (Adler & Borys, 1996; Adler et al., 1999) argued that Japanese automobile companies relied on a formal structure that was just as bureaucratic as that of their U.S. competitors, but the Japanese cultural context provided that structure with higher efficiency, greater flexibility, and stronger worker engagement. Numerous researchers have studied how that combination was adapted to a new cultural and institutional context when Toyota set up operations in the United States, examining how the more individualistic values of U.S. workers and their collective bargaining rights led Toyota to adapt their group-centered model of work organization (Liker, Fruin, & Adler, 1999). Social context—for example, cultural norms, employment regimes, etc.—matters, and more research attentive to these dimensions is needed.

Second, a historical view expands the variety of contexts that shape bureaucracy. Consider the development of the legal-rational bureaucratic organization over the past century in those parts of the world in which it was already more prevalent. Weber would probably be astonished at how often bureaucratic organizations today rely on teams and matrix

reporting structures to support cross-functional integration; at how often officials at higher levels of authority consult middle-level and front-line personnel; and at how often value rationality and “shared purpose” are infused into daily operations (Adler & Heckscher, 2018; Ashcraft, 2001; Gittel & Douglass, 2012; Selznick, 1957). We should not assume that the ideal-typical legal-rational bureaucracy defined by Weber is immutable. Future research might aim to document and theorize the historical trajectories of the various innovations by which the bureaucratic form has been modified and potentially rendered even more effective (building on work such as Barley & Kunda, 1992; Baron et al., 1988; Bodrožić & Adler, 2018; Jacoby, 1985).

We should also take a longer view. Bureaucracy can be found in many chapters of human history—in ancient Sumer (Smith, 2016), China's Song dynasty (Liu, 1959), the Ottoman Empire (Weiker, 1968), revolutionary Indonesia (Soemardjan, 1957), France's fourth republic (Ehrmann, 1961), the communist Soviet Union (Parks, 2016)—and it varied qualitatively across these contexts. For example, in ancient China, the state bureaucracy was suffused with patrimonial domination, where the legitimacy of orders was grounded in the traditionalistic precepts and the traditional prerogatives of rulers.⁹ By contrast, Ang (2017) argued that China today has developed a “bureau-franchising” form of bureaucracy, which introduces market-style incentives and controls in a decentralized legal-rational government bureaucracy. Constat (1958) argued that bureaucratic administrations have been historically deployed by authoritarian and charismatic leaders, even if, in those contexts, administrative rationality is limited.

⁹ This is based on Weber's account of traditional Chinese state bureaucracy. Although built on a weak scholarly foundation (Creel, 1964; Junnan, 2015), his characterization of it as “patrimonial bureaucracy”—a mix of traditionalistic, nonrational and rational-legal types of domination—still appears fruitful. While the system was bureaucratic in its reliance on a relatively open system of national entrance examinations and career paths, even his critics agree that it lacked the ideal type's reliance on specialized areas of expertise: the examinations were mainly tests of candidates' mastery of literature and Confucian thought, and bureaucratic officials were generalists rather than specialists, essentially governors of a region. Moreover, these bureaucrats, while ruling with a degree of impartiality in relation with their subjects, relied extensively on personal relations rather than formal processes in their interactions with others within the bureaucracy.

TABLE 2
Research Pathways for the Study of Bureaucracy

Pathway	Research Directions	Possible Research Questions
Studying bureaucracy in its wider context	Variation across sociocultural contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does bureaucracy vary across cultures, and how do these variants compare with the Weberian ideal-type? • How culturally specific (“Western”) is the Weberian conceptualization? • Can indigenous theories account for distinctive bureaucratic forms?
	Variation over historical periods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does the Weberian ideal-type evolve over time? • How do the authority relations prevailing in the broader society shape the form and enactment of bureaucracy? • What are the distinctive features of bureaucracy that emerge under capitalist conditions?
	The role of bureaucracy in social and economic development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does the emergence and form of bureaucracy support capitalist economic and social development? • What are the cultural effects of the development and diffusion of bureaucracy? • What is the role of bureaucracy in today’s grand challenges?
Studying bureaucracy in action	The creative effort involved in producing, maintaining, and undoing bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What articulation work goes into making bureaucracy work? • How do workers resolve misalignments across bureaucratic features (e.g., between conflicting procedures)? • How does debureaucratization occur? • How are (shared) tacit values learned and diffused in bureaucracy organizations? How do they underpin discretion and rule-bending activities?
	The role of artifacts, tools, and (digital) technology in bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the affordances of different technologies for work in bureaucratic settings? Do low- vs. high-tech tools afford particular discretion and opportunities for rule-bending? • What are the implications of using algorithms in bureaucratic organizations? How do they relate to bureaucratic principles of accountability, impartial administration, and egalitarianism? • How do social media tools reconfigure key bureaucratic aspects (e.g., record-keeping, secrecy, or hierarchical authority)? What forms of bureaucratic organization do they produce? • How do bureaucracies respond to social and political calls for openness? What bureaucratic aspects are reworked, and new work patterns emerge when bureaucracies open up innovation, strategy, or decision-making?
	The interplay of bureaucracy’s material and symbolic elements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How are the effects of bureaucracy mediated by social understandings of it? How specific understandings undergird bureaucratic behavior—e.g., rule-following vs. rule-breaking? • How does the interaction of symbolic and material elements produce particular bureaucratic regimes? • How do symbolic elements legitimize or stigmatize particular bureaucratic arrangements?
	Bureaucracy’s sensorial dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does aesthetic experience influence our relationship with bureaucracy? • How are versions of bureaucracy related to particular building architectures and office layouts? • How do playful office designs, coworking spaces, or remote work produce new forms of bureaucratic organization?
	Emotional work in bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How is bureaucracy’s impartial emotional disposition learned and enacted? • How does impartiality mix with care and commitment? What are the varieties of emotional dispositions displayed and socially endorsed across bureaucratic settings?
Studying bureaucracy’s interdependencies and configurations	Interplay among formal elements of bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which elements are central for bureaucratization in different contexts? • How do formal elements of bureaucracy substitute for each other? • How do new management techniques replace or augment traditional bureaucratic features?

TABLE 2
(Continued)

Pathway	Research Directions	Possible Research Questions
	Interplay among bureaucratic formal elements and informal relations to produce key outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which informal elements are central for bureaucratic ideals such as impartiality? • How are the effects of bureaucratic structures on equality and equity mediated by informal relations? • How do informal work relations influence the capacity of bureaucratic organizations to adjust and improve?

Taking the longer view also allows us to see more clearly the specific form taken by bureaucracy under capitalist conditions. Here, bureaucracy is underpinned by a capitalist type of domination, where legitimate authority flows from the legally sanctioned ownership of society's productive resources, such that the great majority of people need to work for those owners as employees. As a result, when people today express frustration with the alienation and domination they experience at work, we need to ascertain whether the problem lies in the bureaucratic form of management or its capitalist content. As Braverman (1998: 83) cautioned, we should avoid the "evasive and unfortunate use of Weberian terminology" that "attributes to bureaucracy societal ills that are better understood as the specific product of capitalism." Adler (2012) thus argued, along Marxist lines, that although bureaucracy could appear in more enabling or more coercive forms, workers in capitalist firms are generally in a structurally dominated position relative to the employer, and, as a result, bureaucracy is always simultaneously enabling and coercive—it is "sociologically ambivalent" (Merton & Barber, 1963). That is because bureaucracy, as found in capitalist enterprises, is caught between the two poles of a "real contradiction": bureaucracy is both a technology for coordinating interdependent production activity and a technology of domination and exploitation.¹⁰ This suggests that there are insights to be

mined by exploring the tensions between the legitimacy of instrumental rationality and the often arbitrary character of capitalist command (see, e.g., Adler, 2012). Doing so may reveal the mechanisms underwriting the endurance of darker forms of bureaucracy—exploitative, alienating, Kafkaesque, or simply underperforming.

Third, research can be extended fruitfully to address the role of bureaucracy as a driver or enabler of economic and social progress. Bureaucracy appears to be an important factor in capitalist economic development. Specifically, the development of a legal-rational bureaucracy—replacing a traditionalistic patronage system with one based on office-holding officials and meritocratic promotion criteria—is an important facilitator of growth in developing economies (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Evans & Rauch, 1999). Some scholars have argued that the key to development lies less in the structural elements of bureaucratic organization and more in the underlying values guiding the work of office holders; others have argued that development depends on the nature of the interaction between "Weberian" and "indigenous" modes of organizing (Lederer & Höhne, 2019; McDonnell, 2017). Further research is needed to examine which and how distinctive elements and forms of bureaucracy underwrite social and economic development.

Looking beyond economic development, the emergence of bureaucracy relied on and reinforced the diffusion of egalitarian and meritocratic ideals. Given bureaucracy's common shortcomings, it is easy to forget this positive value. For example, a considerable body of research has documented the role of bureaucracy as a force for (gender) equality through its commitment to universalistic criteria and personnel procedures (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kalev, 2015;

¹⁰ On this foundation, the succession of management models analyzed by Barley and Kunda (1992) and Bodrožić and Adler (2018)—that is, line-and-staff, industrial betterment, scientific management, human relations, strategy-and-structure, quality management, business process—can be read as successive partial syntheses of that contradiction. As bureaucracy evolves under the pressure of technological revolutions, each revolution gives rise, first, to a relatively more coercive model and then to a relatively more enabling one, to be overtaken eventually by a

new revolution and a new cycle of more coercive and more enabling models.

Edelman, 1990; Jackson, 1998). Yet, there remains a lot more to unpack in the relation between bureaucracy, patriarchy, and social justice more broadly. For example: how do gendered assumptions about the reliable bureaucrat lead bureaucracies to undermine rather than advance gender equity (Acker, 1990; Billing, 1994; Martin, 2013)? Aiming to advance equality and equity, what is the efficacy of formal bureaucratic mechanisms relative to the efficacy of deliberate efforts to change the organization's informal structure (Dobbin et al., 2015)? And how can bureaucracies ensure that bureaucratic norms of neutrality and equality do not stand in the way of addressing inequities (Radoynovska, 2018)?

Bureaucracy in Action

Bureaucracy is often discussed using reified language. This is visible in the “iron cage” metaphor that emerged in Parson's translation of *Economy and Society* (Baehr, 2001) and subsequent mechanical and object-like imageries—for example, “mechanistic” management system (Burns & Stalker, 1961), “machine bureaucracy” (Mintzberg, 1979), or “machine” organizations (Morgan, 1986). These metaphors encourage a view of bureaucracy as a rigid and lifeless structure outside of—or above—social relations (on the role of metaphors in our understanding of bureaucracy, see also Klagge, 1997). This way of thinking of bureaucracy frames it as *something* with an existence independent from human activity.

The second pathway takes aim at this reification, echoing the turn toward practice approaches in social sciences and the growing interest in the study of work as the foundation for our understanding of organizations and organizing (Barley & Kunda, 2001; Bechky, 2011; Cetina, Schatzki, & Von Savigny, 2005; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Nicolini, 2013). In doing so, we also get closer to the processual aspect of Weber's analysis that has recently been brought into prominence by a new translation of *Economy and Society* (Tribe, 2019). Organizational scholars, especially ones working in the Paradigm perspective, are closest to this pathway, as they have examined the fabric of social relations in bureaucratic organizations. Viewed through these lenses, the control, predictability, and efficiency of bureaucracy are revealed to be effortful and precarious accomplishments. This, in turn, helps us see more clearly how different bureaucracies, even with similar formal structures, produce different outcomes.

We see at least five fruitful research foci under this broad heading: (a) the creative effort involved in producing, maintaining, or undoing bureaucracy; (b) the role of artifacts, tools, and (digital) technology in this process; (c) the interplay of bureaucracy's material and symbolic elements; (d) bureaucracy's sensorial dimension; and (e) emotional work in bureaucracy.

First, while it has often been assumed that “once fully established ... bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy” (Weber, 1978: 987), a practice sensibility brings into focus the creative effort involved in enacting bureaucracy and realizing its promises. For example, the reality of the authority hierarchy cannot be simply read from organizational charts or office layouts: it is continually reproduced and subverted in the ways people relate to each other (Zhang & Spicer, 2014). Bureaucratic values like impartiality do not emerge automatically from procedures or rules, but depend on socialization and the cultivation of a particular climate, or milieu (Du Gay, 2008), as well as effortful and creative ways of bringing personal engagement and empathy to the challenge of applying rules impartially (see, e.g., Margolis & Molinsky, 2008). More research is needed to reveal the ingenious work involved in ensuring the effectiveness of bureaucracy.

This focus also draws our attention to bureaucracy's tacit dimension (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). Bureaucracy is associated with formalized work procedures, yet the deployment of those procedures typically relies on tacit judgment, discretion, and rule-bending (Hampson & Junor, 2005; Lipsky, 2010). Attending to the shared tacit understandings of employees as they work and handle unexpected cases and breakdowns can reveal the priorities and values guiding them (Radoynovska, 2018; Zacka, 2017).

Second, thinking about bureaucracy as an activity brings into focus the tools through which it is accomplished (Carlile, Nicolini, Langley, & Tsoukas, 2013; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Weber (2019) stressed the importance of technologies like the telegraph and telephone for bureaucracy. How then does the introduction of ever more sophisticated digital technologies change or challenge bureaucracy? If the hallmark of bureaucracy is the dominance and legitimacy of instrumentally rational, written procedures, what tensions arise with the introduction of algorithms that underpin decision-making and govern workers based on rules and criteria that are “not readily understood or available for interpretation and scrutiny” (Faraj et al., 2018: 68) (see also

Delfanti, 2021; Kellogg et al., 2020)? These technologies also raise questions about impartiality that will need to be resolved.

Moreover, new information and communication technology, such as social media, simultaneously facilitates interactions across ranks and functional departments and makes those interactions easier to monitor (Leonardi & Vaast, 2017). New technologies supporting remote work may challenge the separation between private and professional spheres that underpin Weber's ideal-typical bureaucracy (Hafermalz, 2021). We have much more research ahead of us to understand whether and how these developments undercut or reinforce bureaucracy's features. Finally, the growth of online platforms has encouraged efforts to open up bureaucracies in various settings, from research labs (Lifshitz-Assaf, 2018) to city administration offices (Kornberger et al., 2017). Additional research is needed on how such bureaucratic organizations digest such changes, blending transparency with secrecy, expertise with crowd wisdom, and official spheres of responsibility with unexpected collaborators.

Third, approaching bureaucracy as a situated activity brings to the fore meaning and the interplay of the organization's material and symbolic elements. While research has concentrated on the effects of formal aspects of bureaucracy on various outcomes, meaning mediates those effects (Leibel, Hallett, & Bechky, 2018). For example, Gouldner (1954) hinted at the role of stories in mythologizing a non-bureaucratic past and stigmatizing the bureaucratization process, but his insight has been rarely taken up in subsequent literature. Organizational researchers have explored the effect of divergent interpretations of bureaucratic rules (Martin, Lopez, Roscigno, & Hodson, 2013), controls (Long, Bendersky, & Morrill, 2011), or goals (Thomas, Sugiyama, Rochford, Stephens, & Kanov, 2018). Public administration scholars advanced the notion of "green tape" to account for bureaucratic rules whose purposes are understood as meaningful (DeHart-Davis, 2009). Future studies could extend these insights by examining how meaning and artifacts interact to produce bureaucracies that are experienced as alienating or empowering; and when and how "bureaucracy" appears as a stigmatized—and stigmatizing—category (Hudson, 2008; Llewellyn, 2004).

Fourth, we have much to learn about the sensorial dimensions of bureaucracy.¹¹ Most of us have filled out forms or stood in front of a service window, but

the embodied and aesthetic aspects of these bureaucratic moments have been underexplored in organizational research (Baldessarelli, Stigliani, & Elsbach, 2021; Frederickson, 2000). Buildings' architecture and office layout (Guillén, 2006; Rosen, Orlikowski, & Schmahmann, 1990) are central to our relation to bureaucracy—and intrinsic to the very etymology of the term. We may thus wonder whether some of the characteristics usually attributed to bureaucracy (e.g., dullness and rigidity) reflect less the reality of the organizational form and more our experience of "boring" building designs or administrative paperwork. Combining the same organizational form with offices designed with more collaboration in mind may yield a very different experience. These and related topics are critical for examining the significance of bodies, space, and aesthetics in shaping our attitude toward different forms of bureaucracy.

Fifth, bureaucratic work is thought to depend on the suppression of emotion, or, more accurately, an impartial and "cool" affect—what Weber referred to as "*sine ira et studio*" (without anger and passion). Such "emotionless" states need closer study and theorization (Eggebo, 2013). While we know a lot about the emotional labor required of flight attendants and other occupations where a display of emotion is required (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Wharton, 2009), we know too little about how individuals learn to embody an impersonal (bureaucratic) comportment at work. Some studies have challenged the emotionless hypothesis, documenting emotional effects of bureaucratic organizing such as frustrations and anxiety (Gabriel, 1998), bounded forms of emotional expression in corporate bureaucracies (Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998), and the role of care and attachment in the work of bureaucrats (Graham, 2002). However, it is still unclear whether and how commitment and impartial emotional states mix. Understanding this process may help us better comprehend the conduct of individuals in bureaucratic organizations, including their nonbureaucratic actions in moments of change and crisis (e.g., Kornberger, Leixnering, & Meyer, 2019).

Bureaucracy's Interdependencies and Configurations

Research pertaining to the Types perspective reminds us that bureaucracy is a complex

¹¹ Bureaucrats, a photographic project of civil servants across eight countries by Jan Bannings, documents in a visual way the ubiquity of our experience with

bureaucracy and some of its aesthetic aspects (see <https://www.janbanning.com/books/bureaucrats/>).

organizational form combining a number of organizational elements. Consider the range of formal controls reviewed by Cardinal et al. (2017), and consider too that any of these types of controls can be targeted at any of a broad set of possible phenomena. These targets can be classified broadly into input, behavior, and output; however, it is clear from Cardinal et al.'s (2017) review that the effectiveness of controls in any organization hinges greatly on the mix of targets not only at that broad level but also at a much finer level of granularity, with the result that bureaucracy's effectiveness depends on the precise mix of these various forms of control. Gibson, Dunlop, and Cordery (2019), for example, showed that formalization can help or hurt team performance depending on precisely what is being formalized: it helps when it clarifies roles and provides clear team boundaries, and it hurts when it limits the flow of knowledge and information within the team.

Further, while the specialization of our research agendas encourages us to study individual features, it is clear that those features are interdependent and that bureaucracy represents a distinct configuration of them. Understanding these interdependencies is critical for management practice as well as theory. In practice, managers must frequently contend with the fact that the changes they may make in one dimension of the organization are likely to have ripple effects on the effectiveness of choices made in other dimensions (Baron & Kreps, 1999; MacDuffie, 1995; Praetorius, Hasle, & Nielsen, 2018).

To deepen our understanding of bureaucracy, we therefore suggest renewed efforts to understand (a) how bureaucracy's formal elements complement and substitute each other and (b) how formal elements interplay with informal relations to produce key outcomes.

First, attending to interdependencies encourages attention to the functional equivalence among bureaucracy's formal elements. Consider centralization and formalization: the Aston Group found that when processes are more formalized, there is less need for centralized decision-making: command and standards are often substitutes (Mintzberg, 1979; Pugh et al., 1968). In Simon's (1947) language, when the decision premises are more standardized, decision-making can be safely decentralized. If we study centralization without considering this interaction, our model is underspecified. If we notice in our data that hierarchies are flatter but overlook the fact that work processes are more formalized, we are likely to mistake what we see for the demise of bureaucracy.

Second, a key lesson of the Paradigm perspective is that the effect of bureaucratic elements is dependent

on their interaction with features of the informal organization (McEvily et al., 2014). Focusing only on more formal elements of bureaucracy (e.g., written procedures) may afford a more parsimonious conceptualization and facilitate measurement, but it risks overlooking how they are enacted and interact with the informal organization, thus potentially generating unexpected outcomes. For example, studies of the role of formal policies in supporting equity and equality have often reached pessimistic conclusions (e.g., Dobbin et al., 2015), but it is important to consider the differences across organizations in the ways these policies are implemented and in the principles underpinning formal procedures. Similarly, the effects of centralization in decision-making depend to a considerable extent on whether the organizational culture affords lower-level personnel opportunities to participate in that decision-making (Mantere & Vaara, 2008).¹² Ditto for formalization: Adler and Borys (1996) showed that participation in the formalization process by assembly-line workers can result in an enabling rather than coercive form of bureaucracy.

More generally, while bureaucracy has been traditionally assumed to erode caring and collectivist relations, researchers have shown that bureaucratic structures can be infused with values and enacted in ways to make relations more prosocial and positive (Ashcraft, 2001; Gittell & Douglass, 2012). As Ashcraft (2006: 78) put it, organizational forms "have tendencies, not destinies ... negotiated by real people under conflicted circumstances." However, to the best of our knowledge, among the rich body of empirical survey-based work on culture (reviewed by Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016; Hartnell, Ou, & Kinicki, 2011), so far none has simultaneously measured the degree of bureaucratization of the formal organization or the interaction of culture and structure in shaping outcomes.

BUREAUCRACY TODAY AND TOMORROW

Let us conclude by returning to the puzzle motivating this paper—the discrepancy between the declining scholarly interest in bureaucracy and the persistence of bureaucracy as the predominant form

¹² Aston scholars have measured centralization as the lowest level at which a decision can legitimately be made without referring it further up the authority hierarchy (Pugh & Hickson, 1976). By the same logic, participation can be understood as how far down an authority hierarchy (or across its subunits) decision-makers need to go in consulting others before they can legitimately arrive at a decision.

of organization. In this section, we draw on our multiperspective understanding to better locate bureaucracy vis-à-vis other organizational forms. In this section, we first survey the current organizational landscape and then address tendencies that are likely to shape the future of bureaucracy as that landscape evolves.

Obviously, a great number of very small organizations operate without the formal structuring of bureaucracy. Yet, the organizing principle underpinning them varies: some embrace robust instrumental rationality—and, to that extent, they might be considered proto-bureaucratic—while others are more traditionalistic, charismatic, or value rational and collegial. In all but the smallest organizations, formal structures are typically bureaucratic, due to both internal pressures (the need to manage more complex interdependencies) and external demands (for accountability, reliability, efficiency, order, and control) (Baron & Hannan, 2002; Baron et al., 1999; Robertson & Swan, 2004; Turco, 2016). Marsden et al. (1994) reported results from the 1991 National Organizations Study showing the very rapid increase in key indicators of bureaucracy as organizations grow past 100 employees. Moreover, despite the fascination that smaller, organic organizations exercise on many management scholars and leaders, large-scale bureaucratic organizations have not disappeared. Most people work for big firms, and that proportion is increasing, not falling—in the United States, 45% of employees worked in enterprises of over 500 people in 1988, and by 2017, that proportion had grown to 53% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019) (for longer trend and international trends, see Poschke, 2018).

Yet, market elements have penetrated bureaucracies in various contexts. We noted above the decentralized form of bureaucracy found in the contemporary Chinese government practice of bureau franchising (Ang, 2017). A homologous combination is common in many big corporations, where business units compete with each other while simultaneously pursuing a common strategy and broad range of common policies (e.g., Freeland, 1996; Makadok & Coff, 2009). Here, the strategizing and policy-setting process is scaffolded by a bureaucratic structure; but market coordination sometimes goes further, such as in W. L. Gore (Halal, 1994; Hamel, 2011) or Haier (Denning, 2019), where the organization is decomposed into smaller, autonomous business units that function as independent profit centers pursuing independent strategies. In these cases, bureaucracy has indeed been displaced, even if bureaucratic elements still play a supporting role in the background.

While neo-institutionalist theory has sensitized us to the symbolic legitimacy factors contributing to the popularity and persistence of bureaucracy, we should not overlook the technical efficiency factors also at work (Besharov & Khurana, 2015). Most notably, if, as Weber (1921/1978) argued, organizations that start as small collegial organizations governed by value rationality tend to evolve into bureaucracies as they grow, it is not only because bosses want to assert dominance but also because this is a way to ensure productive effectiveness at that scale and complexity. The shortcomings of organic, “agile” software development methods in larger-scale, more complex projects testify to Weber’s wisdom in this regard (see Annosi, Foss, & Martini, 2020).

What then of the informal side of these larger organizations? Systematic data are hard to find, but a wealth of studies have suggested that important mutations are under way in the fabric of the informal organization. Purely instrumental rationality has always been a thin foundation on which to build employee commitment and engagement: where tasks are interdependent, no combination of formal procedures and financial incentives is as effective as voluntary cooperation. In the past, where competitive pressure was moderated, that voluntary cooperation has often been stimulated by traditionalistic paternalism, but over the past half-century and more, traditionalism has eroded (Heckscher, 2007). Where competitive performance pressure is more intense, instrumental rationality has often been supplemented, if not displaced, by charismatic leadership. Today, however, we hear much more about “shared purpose” and value rationality. Adler and Heckscher (2018) argued that since Weber’s time, we have seen the emergence of a new, “collaborative” form of value-rational organization, one that deploys a family of management techniques to allow value rationality to be scaled beyond the collegial form—even if, under capitalist conditions, consensus on that shared purpose is always precarious and the collaborative form therefore unstable.

Looking Forward

How, then, should we expect bureaucracy’s form and place in the organizational landscape to evolve under the impact of new technologies and management innovations? Looking backward, bureaucracy emerged in industry at the end of the 19th century in a context where the reduction of transportation costs and the growth of mechanization created economic incentives to rationalize large-scale flows of goods. In

this context, bureaucracy was the modal response. As Baldwin (2019: 3) wrote, this work regime “contained bottlenecks that required active managerial supervision, frequent intervention, and central coordination ... The need to manage bottlenecks in turn provided strong inducements to design organizations subject to strong central control and direct authority.” What are the prospects looking forward?

Technological change—most notably in the form of new information and computer technologies—is reducing the transaction costs associated with market coordination. Thus, some observers anticipate more reliance on market exchange, and a shift to smaller, less bureaucratic organizations, perhaps linked via platforms. On the other hand, technological change is also reducing the costs of hierarchical, bureaucratic coordination. The sparse evidence available suggests that, so far, these two effects have roughly counterbalanced each other (Dosi, Gambardella, Grazzi, & Orsenigo, 2008; Saunders, 2011), and it is not obvious that this balance will change in the future.

New technologies have also enabled new types of organizations in which bureaucracy can take new forms or be combined with or displaced by other coordination mechanisms. The following paragraphs briefly sketch a few of them as seen through our multi-perspective lenses.

Consider one currently popular new organizational model: holacracy (Bernstein, Bunch, Canner, & Lee, 2016). Often presented as an unprecedented novelty in organization design, it is, we suggest, more plausibly understood as an updated, IT-enabled version of the workflow bureaucracy documented by the Aston Group. Its extensive formalization and the idea of differentiating roles from the people who fill them will look familiar to anyone who has read Weber. Holacracy’s commitment to the idea that work units should govern their internal work processes in a collegial manner was never excluded from Weber’s ideal type, and it was a key part of Blau’s (1963) “dynamic” variety of bureaucracy. The novelty here is in how holacracies—in the pursuit of adaptability over reliability—forego strategic synergy and economies of scale and scope for market responsiveness and rapid incremental adaptation. Classic contingency theory suggests that there are limits to how far such an organizational form can diffuse across the variegated economic landscape.

Consider platforms such as Uber. On the one hand, the technology-enabled emergence of such platforms erodes the centrality of the bureaucratic firm. For Uber

drivers, the notion of a full-time bureaucratic “office” loses most of its meaning, and the notion of career evaporates. Bureaucratic hierarchy seems to be displaced by market exchange. Yet, three considerations weigh against extrapolating from this the demise of bureaucracy. First, it is far from clear that this platform-based “free agent” model will prevail outside a limited band of activities where work can be so rigorously individualized (Fleming, Rhodes, & Yu, 2019). Second, Uber relies on a centralized scheduling system and close prescription and monitoring of the work of its drivers. The hierarchical employment relation here is only clumsily disguised as a market relation—largely a stratagem to evade regulation. To be sure, the automation of driving procedures and of monitoring changes the lived experience of this kind of control (Kellogg et al., 2020), but the instrumentally rational principle behind it remains the same. Third, Uber, as a large and growing company, seems to be organized internally according to classical bureaucratic lines (Business Research Methodology, 2018; Hinings, Gegenhuber, & Greenwood, 2018).

Finally, consider not-for-profit “open-source” collaboration platforms like Wikipedia and Debian/Linux (Butler, Joyce, & Pike, 2008; Jemielniak, 2014; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). Here we see large-scale communities, often governed by value rationality. Bureaucracy plays a subordinate but significant role: individual contributions are carefully screened according to increasingly elaborate and standardized procedures, and the governance of the community is assured by individuals in formally identified roles who draw on bureaucratic tools to organize the work (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). This is a very attractive model for certain tasks, and established organizations are experimenting with it. However, its diffusion runs into the limits of modularity: many products today are complex systems of interdependent components, and it is not often cost effective to invest the effort to standardize the interfaces for all these components (Baldwin, 2019). It is much easier to modularize Wikipedia entries and Linux features than the parts and subsystems of an automobile or a plane. There is surely scope for the growth of open source communities, but their place in the overall economy—and the role of bureaucracy in them—are open questions.

CONCLUSION

In the middle of the last century, Gouldner (1955) highlighted the “pathos”—specifically, the tone of fatalism and pessimism—that was limiting

scholarship on bureaucracy: bureaucracy was inevitable in the modern world, and that was depressing. More recently, Selznick (1996: 276–177) commented on how organizational scholars, after decades of work, still struggle “to define bureaucracy in a more neutral way, recognizing that the pathologies of bureaucracy are real and endemic, but insisting that they should be considered contingent, not essential, subject to remedy, not inevitable.” Sadly, bureaucracy continues to be understood in essentialized terms. Authors in management and scholarly publications commonly refer pejoratively to it and contrast unfavorably (a stereotyped form of) bureaucracy with “new” or “alternative” organizational forms.

The assumption is often that bureaucracy necessarily tends to lead to certain outcomes, and if some of those outcomes, such as reliability, might be positive, they are inevitably counterbalanced by negative ones, such as rigidity, conformism, or goal displacement (e.g., Bosk, 2007; Davis, 1948; Heckscher, 1994; Merton, 1940). This pathos persists, notwithstanding research on the empowering potential of bureaucracy (e.g., Adler & Borys, 1996; Ashcraft, 2001; Pheysey, Payne, & Pugh, 1971); notwithstanding the empirical research documenting the prevalence of creativity and cosmopolitanism, not just conformism, in bureaucracies (e.g., Kohn, 1971; Parks, 2016); and notwithstanding studies showing some bureaucratic organizations’ capacity for flexibility (e.g., Adler et al., 1999; Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Klein et al., 2006).

(Mis)understood in such a manner, bureaucracy appears outdated or irrelevant for current management theory and practice—only to have its effectiveness (re)discovered. Turco’s (2016) case study of a small social media organization illustrates this sequence, showing that founders invested considerable effort in avoiding “bureaucracy” (understood in narrow and pejorative terms) only to rediscover its relevance (see also review by Bechky, 2018). This pattern was pointed out by Perrow (1986) decades ago: while people may lament the proliferation of red tape, in the next breath many complain that “there ought to be a rule;” they grumble about hierarchy, but in the next breath ask, “Who’s in charge around here?”

Such ambivalence is not fortuitous. Bureaucracy has been both a weapon of domination and the primary tool for realizing many of humanity’s most significant undertakings—from pyramids to space exploration and the administration of large organizations ranging from armies to social security agencies to gargantuan industrial enterprises. Our ability to meet the various challenges that confront us today—

inter alia, pandemics, sustainability, poverty, inequalities—hinges on our ability to effectively leverage and further refine bureaucracy. For example, any sustained effort to mitigate or adapt to challenges such as climate change will require key features of bureaucracy—for example, formalized triple-bottom-line performance indicators, sustainability standards, and an ethos of neutrality rather than favoritism in applying them. We therefore need to ensure that our deployment of bureaucracy against these grand challenges is emancipatory, and not an extension of domination.

In this context, we should recall (Gouldner, 1955: 497) observation that “discussions of bureaucratic organization which are heir to the Weberian analysis must be understood as being, in part, a displacement of the controversy over socialism.” Indeed, socialists—including those concerned with the crises we face today (e.g., Lowy, 2007)—envisage a vastly enlarged public sector, with government bureaucracy setting the direction for the entire economy directly or indirectly. On the one hand, many people today, like Weber in his time, fear socialism precisely because of this reliance on bureaucracy (Kilker, 1984). The classic statement is that by Hayek (1956), who decried the growth of the government sector because it cannot but constrain individual choice and undermine freedom (as he understood it). On the other hand, Gouldner (1955) and other Marxists (e.g., Adler, 2019) have argued that a close analysis of bureaucracy in our current capitalist context suggests that a democratic form of bureaucracy is indeed possible in the future. Bureaucracy, they have argued, can be a tool of democratic governance, and even massive government bureaucracies can be experienced as enabling by citizens and government workers alike—facilitating the effective pursuit of our shared goals. Organizational research has a key role to play in shedding light on how we can employ bureaucracy effectively for the greater good.

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APPENDIX A

TABLE A1
Papers in Leading Journals per Perspective

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
1	1957	Soemardjan, S.	Bureaucratic organization in a time of revolution	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1958	Bendavid, J.	The professional-role of the physician in bureaucratized medicine—A study in role-conflict	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	1959	Liu, J.	11th-century Chinese bureaucrats—Some historical classifications and behavioral types	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1959	Eisenstadt, S.	Bureaucracy, bureaucratization, and debureaucratization	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1960	Satow, R.	Value-rational authority and professional organizations: weber's missing type	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1961	Constas, H.	The USSR—From charismatic sect to bureaucratic society	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1963	Delany, W.	The development and decline of patrimonial and bureaucratic administrations	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1970	Weaver, J.	Value patterns of a Latin-American bureaucracy	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	1975	Satow, R.	Some sociological observations on the response of israeli organizations to new immigrants	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1978	Brown, R.	Bureaucracy as praxis—Toward a political phenomenology of formal organizations	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1983	Weiss, R.	Weber on bureaucracy—Management consultant or political theorist	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>
1	1983	Conaty, J., Mahmoudi, H., & Miller, G.	Social-structure and bureaucracy—A comparison of organizations in the United-States and prerevolutionary Iran	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1984	Langton, J.	The ecological theory of bureaucracy—The case of Wedgwood, Josiah and the British pottery industry	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1984	Shenkar, O.	Is bureaucracy inevitable—the Chinese experience	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1985	Astley, W.	Organizational size and bureaucratic structure	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1992	Du Gay, P., & Salaman, G.	The cult[ure] of the customer	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
1	1993	Nelson, R.	Authority, organization, and societal context in multinational churches	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	1994	Tuckman, A.	The yellow brick road—Total quality management and the restructuring of organizational culture	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1994	Diribarne, P.	The honor principle in the bureaucratic phenomenon	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1995	Lu, Y., & Heard, R.	Socialized economic-action—A comparison of strategic investment decisions in china and Britain	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1995	Grancelli, B.	Organizational-change—Toward a new east-west comparison	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1996	Du Gay, P., Salaman, G., & Rees, B.	The conduct of management and the management of conduct: Contemporary managerial discourse and the constitution of the “competent” manager	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
1	1997	Ten Bos, R.	Essai: Business ethics and Bauman ethics	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	1997	Harley, S., & Lee, F.	Research selectivity, managerialism, and the academic labor process: The future of nonmainstream economics in UK universities	<i>Human Relations</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
1	1999	Dijksterhuis, M., Van Den Bosch, F., & Volberda, H.	Where do new organizational forms come from? Management logics as a source of coevolution	<i>Organization Science</i>
1	2000	Pearce, J., Branyiczki, I., & Bigley, G.	Insufficient bureaucracy: Trust and commitment in particularistic organizations	<i>Organization Science</i>
1	2000	Courpasson, D.	Managerial strategies of domination. Power in soft bureaucracies	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2001	Gray, C., & Garsten, C.	Trust, control and post-bureaucracy	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2001	Ten Bos, R., & Willmott, H.	Toward a post-dualistic business ethics: Interweaving reason and emotion in working life	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
1	2002	Armbruster, T., & Gebert, D.	Uncharted territories of organizational research: The case of Karl popper's open society and its enemies	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2003	Kallinikos, J.	Work, human agency and organizational forms: An anatomy of fragmentation	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2003	Courpasson, D., & Dany, F.	Indifference or obedience? Business firms as democratic hybrids	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2003	Liu, S.	Cultures within culture: Unity and diversity of two generations of employees in state-owned enterprises	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2004	Ballas, A., & Tsoukas, H.	Measuring nothing: The case of the Greek national health system	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2004	Clegg, S., & Courpasson, D.	Political hybrids: Tocquevillian views on project organizations	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
1	2005	Hoogenboom, M., & Ossewaarde, R.	From iron cage to pigeon house: The birth of reflexive authority	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2005	Heugens, P.	A neo-Weberian theory of the firm	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2005	Clegg, S.	Puritans, visionaries and survivors	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2006	Drori, G. S., Jang, Y., & Meyer, J. W.	Sources of Rationalized Governance: Cross-National Longitudinal Analyses 1985-2002	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	2007	Vaast, E.	What goes online comes offline: Knowledge management system use in a soft bureaucracy	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2008	Harris, M.	Digital technology and governance in transition: the case of the British library	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2009	Hwang, H., & Powell, W.	The rationalization of charity: The influences of professionalism in the nonprofit sector	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
1	2010	Hodson, R.	Work group effort and rewards: The roles of organizational and social power as context	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2010	Clegg, S., & Baumeler, C.	Essai: From iron cages to liquid modernity in organization analysis	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2011	Brivot, M.	Controls of knowledge production, sharing and use in bureaucratized professional service firms	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2011	Jensen, T., & Sandstrom, J.	Stakeholder theory and globalization: The challenges of power and responsibility	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2011	O'Reilly, D., & Reed, M.	The grit in the oyster: Professionalism, managerialism and leaderism as discourses of UK public services modernization	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2011	Kamoche, K., & Maguire, K.	Pit sense: Appropriation of practice-based knowledge in a UK coalmine	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2011	Fleming, P., & Sturdy, A.	"Being yourself" in the electronic sweatshop: New forms of normative control	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2012	Segal, L., Lehrer, & M.	The institutionalization of stewardship: Theory, propositions, and insights from change in the Edmonton public schools	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2012	Hassard, J., Morris, J., & McCann, L.	"My brilliant career?" New organizational forms and changing managerial careers in japan, the UK, and USA	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
1	2014	Kamoche, K., Kannan, S., & Siebers, L. Q.	Knowledge-sharing, control, compliance and symbolic violence	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2015	Adler, P. S.	Community and innovation: From Tonnies to Marx	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2015	Bleiklie, I., Enders, J., & Lepori, B.	Organizations as penetrated hierarchies: Environmental pressures and control in professional organizations	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2015	Hirst, A., & Humphreys, M.	Configurable bureaucracy and the making of modular man	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2015	Russell, S., & McCabe, D.	Regulators, conformers and cowboys: The enterprise discourse, power and resistance in the UK passive fire protection industry	<i>Organization Studies</i>
1	2015	Mangen, C., & Brivot, M.	The challenge of sustaining organizational hybridity: The role of power and agency	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2016	Swan, J., Scarbrough, H., & Ziebro, M.	Liminal roles as a source of creative agency in management: The case of knowledge-sharing communities	<i>Human Relations</i>
1	2016	Morris, J., Farrell, C., & Reed, M.	The indeterminacy of “temporariness”: Control and power in neo-bureaucratic organizations and work in UK television	<i>Human Relations</i>
2	1957	Smith, E.	Bureaucratic organization—Selective or saturative	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1957	Berger, M.	Bureaucracy east and west	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1957	Coates, C., & Pellegrin, R.	Executives and supervisors—Informal factors in differential bureaucratic promotion	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1958	Gusfield, J.	Equalitarianism and bureaucratic recruitment	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1959	Heady, F.	Bureaucratic theory and comparative administration	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1960	Phelan, J.	Authority and flexibility in the Spanish imperial bureaucracy	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1961	Landsberger, H.	The horizontal dimension in bureaucracy	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1961	Presthus, R.	Weberian v welfare bureaucracy in traditional society	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1965	Thompson, V.	Bureaucracy and innovation	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1968	Denhardt, R.	Bureaucratic socialization and organizational accommodation	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1968	Kaplan, B.	Notes on a non-Weberian model of bureaucracy—Case of development bureaucracy	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1969	Pugh, D., Hickson, D., & Hinings, C.	An empirical taxonomy of structures of work organizations	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1970	Engel, G.	Professional autonomy and bureaucratic organization	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1970	Samuel, Y., & Mannheim, B.	Multidimensional approach toward a typology of bureaucracy	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1971	Miner, J.	Changes in student attitudes toward bureaucratic role prescriptions during 1960s	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1971	Rossel, R.	Autonomy in bureaucracies	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1973	Vosburgh, W., & Hyman, D.	Advocacy and bureaucracy—Life and times of a decentralized citizens advocacy program	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1973	Baker, S., Etzioni, A., Hansen, R. A., & Sontag, M.	Tolerance for bureaucratic structure—Theory and measurement	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1974	Sorensen, J. E., & Sorensen, T.	Conflict of professionals in bureaucratic organizations	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1975	Maniha, J.	Universalism and particularism in bureaucratizing organizations	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1977	Bacharach, S., & Aiken, M.	Communication in administrative bureaucracies	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
2	1977	Miles, R., & Petty, M.	Leader effectiveness in small bureaucracies	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
2	1977	Bozeman, B., & Mcalpine, W.	Goals and bureaucratic decision-making—Experiment	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1978	Halaby, C.	Bureaucratic promotion criteria	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
2	1979	Jermier, J., & Berkes, L.	Leader-behavior in a police command bureaucracy—Closer look at the quasi-military model	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1985	Spicer, M.	A public choice approach to motivating people in bureaucratic organizations	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>
2	1985	Feldman, S.	Culture and conformity—an essay on individual adaptation in centralized bureaucracy	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1991	Jermier, J., Slocum, J., Fry, L., & Gaines, J.	Organizational subcultures in a soft bureaucracy: Resistance behind the myth and facade of an official culture	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	1991	Baum, H. S.	Creating a family in the workplace	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1992	Stevens, F., Philipsen, H., & Diederiks, J.	Organizational and professional predictors of physician satisfaction	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1993	Robertson, D., & Anderson, E.	Control-system and task environment effects on ethical judgment—An exploratory-study of industrial salespeople	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	1994	Reinelt, C.	Fostering empowerment, building community—The challenge for state-funded feminist organizations	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1994	Morgen, S.	Personalizing personnel decisions in feminist organizational theory and practice	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1994	Harrison, M.	Professional control as process—Beyond structural theories	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1994	Slack, T., & Hinings, B.	Institutional pressures and isomorphic change—An empirical-test	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1995	Meyer, H.	Organizational environments and organizational discourse—Bureaucracy between 2 worlds	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	1995	Morand, D.	The role of behavioral formality and informality in the enactment of bureaucratic versus organic organizations	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>
2	1996	Adler, P., & Borys, B.	Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1996	Bresnen, M., & Fowler, C.	Professionalization and British management practice: Case evidence from medium-sized firms in two industrial sectors	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
2	1996	Holmernesadan, M.	Organizational identity and space of action	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1997	Hynes, T., & Prasad, P.	Patterns of “mock bureaucracy” in mining disasters: An analysis of the Westray coal mine explosion	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
2	1997	Linstead, S.	Abjection and organization: men, violence, and management	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	1998	Martin, J., Knopoff, K., & Beckman, C.	An alternative to bureaucratic impersonality and emotional labor: Bounded emotionality at The Body Shop	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	1998	Uhl-Bien, M., & Graen, G. B.	Individual self-management: Analysis of professionals’ self-managing activities in functional and cross-functional work teams	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
2	1999	Adler, P., Goldoftas, B., & Levine, D.	Flexibility versus efficiency? A case study of model changeovers in the Toyota Production System	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	2000	Burt, R., Hogarth, R., & Michaud, C.	The social capital of french and American managers	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	2001	Barley, S., & Kunda, G.	Bringing work back in	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	2001	Ashcraft, K.	Organized dissonance: Feminist bureaucracy as hybrid form	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
2	2003	Brooks, I.	Systemic exchange: Responsibility for angst	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2004	Llewellyn, N.	In search of modernization: The negotiation of social identity in organizational reform	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2005	Currie, G., & Procter, S. J.	The antecedents of middle managers’ strategic contribution: The case of a professional bureaucracy	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
2	2006	Elliott, D., & Smith, D.	Cultural readjustment after crisis: Regulation and learning from crisis within the UK soccer industry	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
2	2007	Briscoe, F.	From iron cage to iron shield? How bureaucracy enables temporal flexibility for professional service workers	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	2007	Warner, M.	Kafka, Weber and organization theory	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2007	Mcgovern, G., & Ferlie, E.	Playing tick-box games: Interrelating defenses in professional appraisal	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2009	Waring, J., & Currie, G.	Managing expert knowledge: Organizational challenges and managerial futures for the UK medical profession	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2012	Adler, P.	The sociological ambivalence of bureaucracy: From Weber via Gouldner to Marx	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	2012	Gittell, J., & Douglass, A.	Relational bureaucracy: Structuring reciprocal relationships into roles	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>
2	2013	Martin, A., Lopez, S., Roscigno, V., & Hodson, R.	Against the rules: Synthesizing types and processes of bureaucratic rule-breaking	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>
2	2013	Hodson, R., Roscigno, V. J., Martin, A., & Lopez, S. H.	The ascension of Kafkaesque bureaucracy in private sector organizations	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2014	Canales, R.	Weaving straw into gold: Managing organizational tensions between standardization and flexibility in microfinance	<i>Organization Science</i>
2	2014	Zhang, Z. Y., & Spicer, A.	“Leader, you first”: The everyday production of hierarchical space in a Chinese bureaucracy	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2014	Mccabe, D.	Light in the darkness? Managers in the back office of a Kafkaesque bank	<i>Organization Studies</i>
2	2015	Huising, R.	To hive or to hold? Producing professional authority through scut work	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
2	2017	Kornberger, M., Meyer, R. E., B.randtner, C., & Hollerer, M. A.	When bureaucracy meets the crowd: Studying “open government” in the Vienna city administration	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	1959	Stinchcombe, A. L.	Bureaucratic and craft administration of production—A comparative-study	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1962	Hall, R.	Intraorganizational structural variation—Application of the bureaucratic model	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1963	Pugh D., Hickson, D., Hinings, C., Macdonald, C., Turner, C., & Lupton, T.	A conceptual scheme for organizational analysis	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1968	Pugh, D., Hickson, D., Hinings, C., & Turner, C.	Dimensions of organization structure	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1969	Pugh, D., Hickson, D., & Hinings, C.	The context of organization structures	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1971	Pheysey, D. C., Payne, R. L., & Pugh, D. S.	Influence of structure at organizational and group levels	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1972	Glueck, W., & Dennis, D.	Bureaucratic, democratic and environmental approaches to organization design	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	1973	Mansfield, R.	Bureaucracy and centralization—Examination of organizational structure	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1973	Reimann, B.	Dimensions of bureaucratic structure—Empirical reappraisal	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1973	Hlavacek, J., & Thompson, V.	Bureaucracy and new product innovation	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	1978	Shamir, B.	Between bureaucracy and hospitality—Some organizational characteristics of hotels	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	1980	Ouchi, W.	Markets, bureaucracies, and clans	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1980	Aiken, M., Bacharach, S., & French, J.	Organizational-structure, work process, and proposal making in administrative bureaucracies	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
3	1981	Grinyer, P., & Yasaiardekani, M.	Strategy, structure, size and bureaucracy	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	1981	Eccles, R.	Bureaucratic versus craft administration—The relationship of market-structure to the construction firm	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1982	Pool, J.	Research note—Bureaucracy in hospitals—An empirical-test of halls theory in one organizational type	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	1983	Cheng, J., & Mckinley, W.	Toward an integration of organization research and practice—A contingency study of bureaucratic control and performance in scientific settings	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1988	Boisot, M., & Child, J.	The iron law of fiefs—Bureaucratic failure and the problem of governance in The Chinese economic-reforms	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1991	Wilderom, C., & Miner, J.	Defining Voluntary Groups and Agencies Within OS	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	1992	B.ailey, D., & Neilsen, E.	Creating a bureau-adhocracy—Integrating standardized and innovative services in a professional work group	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	1993	Barker, J.	Tightening the iron cage—Concertive control in self-managing teams	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1993	Haveman, H.	Organizational size and change—Diversification in the savings and loan industry after deregulation	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1993	Davisblake, A., & Uzzi, B.	Determinants of employment externalization—A study of temporary workers and independent contractors	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1993	Alvesson, M., & Lindkvist, L.	Transaction costs, clans and corporate culture	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	1994	Daveni, R., & Ravenscraft, D.	Economies of integration versus bureaucracy costs—Does vertical integration improve performance	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	1994	Gupta, P., Dirsmith, M., & Fogarty, T.	Coordination and control in a government agency—Contingency and institutional theory perspectives on GAO audits	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1994	Miner, J., Crane, D., & Vandenberg, R.	Congruence and fit in professional-role motivation theory	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	1994	Victor, B., & Stephens,	The dark side of the new organizational forms—An editorial essay	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	1994	Alvesson, M.	Talking in organizations—Managing identity and impressions in an advertising agency	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	1995	Spender, J., & Kessler, H.	Managing the uncertainties of innovation—Extending Thompson (1967)	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	1996	Smith, A., & Zeithaml, C.	Garbage cans and advancing hypercompetition: The creation and exploitation of new capabilities and strategic flexibility in two regional bell operating companies	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	1996	Volberda, H.	Toward the flexible form: How to remain vital in hypercompetitive environments	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	1997	Jarley, P., Fiorito, J., & Delaney, J.	A structural, contingency approach to bureaucracy and democracy in us national unions	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	1998	Schulz, M.	Limits to bureaucratic growth: The density dependence of organizational rule births	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	1998	Chakravarthy, B., & Gargiulo, M.	Maintaining leadership legitimacy in the transition to new organizational forms	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	1998	Ashforth, B., Saks, A., & Lee, R.	Socialization and newcomer adjustment: The role of organizational context	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2000	Hill, S., Martin, R., & Harris, M.	Decentralization, integration and the post-bureaucratic organization: the case of R&D	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
3	2001	Adler, P.	Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge economy and the future of capitalism	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	2001	Bigley, G., & Roberts, K.	The incident command system: High-reliability organizing for complex and volatile task environments	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	2001	Gittell, J.	Supervisory span, relational coordination, and flight departure performance: A reassessment of post bureaucracy theory	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	2001	Donaldson, L.	Reflections on knowledge and knowledge-intensive firms	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2001	Cobb, A. T., Stephens, C., & Watson, G.	Beyond structure: The role of social accounts in implementing ideal control	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2002	Schneider, M.	A stakeholder model of organizational leadership	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	2002	Boyne, G.	Public and private management: What's the difference?	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	2004	Andersen, T.	Integrating decentralized strategy making and strategic planning processes in dynamic environments	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	2005	Cliff, J. E., Langton, N., & Aldrich, H.	Walking the talk? Gendered rhetoric vs. action in small firms	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2005	Walton, E.	The persistence of bureaucracy: A metaanalysis of weber's model of bureaucratic control	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2006	Klein, K. J., Ziegert, J., Knight, A., & Xiao, Y.	Dynamic delegation: Hierarchical, shared and deindividualized leadership in extreme action teams	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	2006	Tengblad, S.	Is there a "new managerial work?" A comparison with henry Mintzberg's classic study 30 years later	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	2007	O'Mahony, S., & Ferraro, F.	The emergence of governance in an open source community	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	2007	Sorensen, J.	Bureaucracy and entrepreneurship: Workplace effects on entrepreneurial entry	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	2007	Frenkel, S., & Sanders, K.	Explaining variations in co-worker assistance in organizations	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2008	Robson, M., Katsikeas, C., & Bello, D.	Drivers and performance outcomes of trust in international strategic alliances: The role of organizational complexity	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	2009	Malhotra, N., & Morris, T.	Heterogeneity in professional service firms	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	2010	Bunderson, J., & Boumgarden, P.	Structure and learning in self-managed teams: Why "bureaucratic" teams can be better learners	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	2011	Hirst, G., Van Knippenberg, D., Chen, C., & Sacramento, C.	How does bureaucracy impact individual creativity? A cross-level investigation of team contextual influences on goal orientation-creativity relationships	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	2011	Long, C., Bendersky, C., & Morrill, C.	Fairness monitoring: Linking managerial controls and fairness judgments in organizations	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
3	2011	Diefenbach, T., & Sillince, J.	Formal and informal hierarchy in different types of organization	<i>Organization Studies</i>
3	2012	Kacperczyk, A.	Opportunity structures in established firms: Entrepreneurship versus intrapreneurship in mutual funds	<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>
3	2012	Dobrev, S.	Career change and the iron cage: Organizations and the early labor market experience of professional managers	<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>
3	2014	Meuer, J.	Archetypes of inter-firm relations in the implementation of management innovation: A set-theoretic study in China's biopharmaceutical industry	<i>Organization Studies</i>

TABLE A1
(Continued)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
3	2017	Tan, D., Tan, J.	Far from the tree? Do private entrepreneurs agglomerate around public sector incumbents during economic transition?	<i>Organization Science</i>
3	2018	Thomas, N., Sugiyama, K., Rochford, K., Stephens, J., & Kanov, J.	Experiential organizing: Pursuing relational and bureaucratic goals through symbolically and experientially oriented work	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>

(1 = Bureaucracy as Principle, 2 = Bureaucracy as Paradigm, 3 = Bureaucracy as Type)

TABLE A2
Definitions of Bureaucracy across Perspectives

Perspective 1: Bureaucracy as a Principle	1.1 Bureaucracy as instrumental rationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action. (Weber, 1921/1978: 987)</i> • <i>“Rational bureaucracy” represents not so much a system of analytical categories as they do an attempt to capture the “spirit” of contemporary administration. (Udy, 1959: 791–792)</i> • <i>Bureaucracy maximizes formal rationality precisely by centralizing the locus of control at the top of the organization. (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979: 518)</i> • <i>Weber’s critique of bureaucratic rationalization is based on the distinction between instrumental rationality and value rationality Because bureaucracy is fundamentally instrumentally rational in its operations. (Waters, 1989: 949)</i> • <i>We begin by exploring the multifaceted nature of the Progressive movement, and explain how one set of values—efficiency and rationality through impartial bureaucracy—came to over-shadow other values, notably the equitable dispersion of power. ... How could cold, calculating bureaucracy be accepted in an industry that valued community and mutuality? (Haveman, Rao and Paruchuri, 2007: 119)</i> • <i>The broader process of rationalization of which bureaucratic organization is an expression. (Esmark, 2017: 502)</i> • <i>Bureaucracy is a form of rational organization because every genuinely bureaucratic act, says Weber (p. 565), is based on a “system of rationally debatable “reasons”, namely either subsumption under legal norms, or a weighing of ends and means. (Kornberger et al., 2017)</i>
	1.2 Bureaucracy as value rationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Emphasis on subjective cause, on the bureaucratic mentality or the “spirit” of bureaucracy, is not presented as complete or definitive rather to override conventional and, we believe misleading understandings of Weber’s bureaucracy as macro-social structure. (Hilbert, 1987: 76)</i> • <i>The general proposition universally applied within organizations has usually been the meritocratic one ... Universalistic organizational practices were first described in detail by Weber and labeled “bureaucracy.” (Pearce et al., 2000: 149)</i> • <i>Weber was not simply or exclusively interested in offering a formal organizational theory of “bureaucracy” but rather ... with indicating the ethical-cultural attributes of bureaucratic conduct. In order to approach Weber’s work in this way—as an anthropologist of Lebensführung or “conduct of life”—it is first necessary to dispense with the detritus of the Parsonian. (Du Gay, 2008: 337).</i> • <i>The traditional public administration in continental European countries with its heritage of a legalistic and Weberian-style state bureaucracy ... is</i>

TABLE A2
(Continued)

	<p>1.3 Bureaucracy as domination</p>	<p>characterized by core values such as equity, professionalism, public interest, procedural safeguards, acceptance of superordination and subordination, impartiality, and neutrality. (Meyer et al., 2014: 865)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideal-typical bureaucratic features were social technologies that—under the conditions Weber observed—cultivated that transformational bureaucratic ethos, facilitating impersonal administration ... Without the bureaucratic ethos, characteristic bureaucratic features often fail to achieve the ends of rational, predictable, effective administration. (McDonnell, 2017: 495). • As Weber (1921/1978: 959) makes clear, public bureaucracies are founded on and supported by an ethos and a number of foundational cultural values ... the ethical discipline of bureaucrats “tends to be side-lined when discussions of bureaucracy and/or post-bureaucracy are directed primarily at their technical capabilities as organizational forms or socio-technical systems.” (Lopdrup-Hjorth and Roelsgaard Obling, 2018: 5). • Bureaucracy mainly as an instrument of power, of exercising control over people and over different spheres of life, and of continuous expansion of such power either in the interest of the bureaucracy itself or in the interest of some (often sinister) masters. (Eisenstadt, 1959: 303) • Weber conceived of bureaucracy as an administrative structure based on legal domination The definition considered the effect of both the administrative structure ... and the physical structure, which includes the amount and types of supplies, tools, and large items of equipment with which work is performed. (Engel, 1970: 13). • Bureaucracy, then, was analyzed [by Weber] because it was the clearest example of the structural form taken by rational-legal domination. (Weiss, 1983: 245) • The creation of a bureaucratic organization, Weber (1921/1978: 9) also stressed, demands not only calculation, but power and authority as well. Bureaucracy ... is established only through the exercise of thoughtful, legitimate domination. ... if the leadership of an organization is to be successful in its effort to bureaucratize its staff, it must be able to neutralize countervailing sources of power, which means that it must completely control the means of production and administration. (Langton, 1984: 334). • Bureaucracy is a tool, a social tool, which legitimizes the control of numerous people by the very few. (Perrow, 1986: 5). • Max Weber regarded bureaucracy as the purest type of exercise of legal authority in society, and as the system of organization best suited to the success of modern capitalist societies. I use the term “system” because Weber understood bureaucracy to be more than just an organizational form. It was founded on certain social criteria that defined the selection, rights, obligations and remuneration of appointed officials who worked in an entirely separate role to that of ownership. (Child, 2015: 31)
<p>Perspective 2: Bureaucracy as a Paradigm</p>	<p>2.1 Bureaucracy as a dysfunctional organizational paradigm</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The positive attainments and functions of bureaucratic organization are emphasized, and the internal stresses and strains of such structures are almost wholly neglected. The community at large, however, evidently emphasizes the imperfections of bureaucracy.” (Merton, 1940: 562). • A bureaucratic organization is an organization where the feedback process, error-information-correction, does not function well, and where consequently there cannot be any quick readjustment of the programs of action in the view of the errors committed ... a bureaucratic organization is an organization that cannot correct its behavior by learning from its errors. Bureaucracy patterns of action, such as impersonality of the rules and the centralization of decision-making, have been so stabilized that they have become part of the organization’s self-reinforcing equilibria. (Crozier, 1964: 177). • There is such an inherent and fundamental limitation of bureaucracy, one that derives from its very foundation in the specification of offices: That is that people are responsible only for their own jobs. ... The paradigm of a bureaucrat’s attitude—a good one as well as a bad one—is “That’s not my

TABLE A2
(Continued)

2.2 Bureaucracy as a flexible organizational paradigm	<p>job”; ... Improving bureaucratic management only makes this more true. (Heckscher, 1994: 20).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kafka’s bottom-up view of bureaucracy captures important dynamics that Weber’s more top-down formal-rational model does not. Moreover, the deviations from formal rationality he identifies differ from those identified by academic critiques of bureaucratic failings (e.g., bureaucratic rigidity, which has its origins in formal rationality). Instead, we argue that Kafkaesque elements represent forces in direct tension with core Weberian bureaucratic values of rationality and meritocracy and, in fact, often pervert seemingly formal-rational bureaucracy toward more narrow subordination to the interests of those at the top of organizations. (Hodson et al., 2013: 1253) • The use of the term bureaucracy, not as designating an administrative organization as such, but rather some special characteristics of that organization, is common in the literature ... Bureaucracy is concerned with the behavior of officials ... It is clear from this definition that the emphasis is on the informal structure as the mechanism or manifestation of bureaucratic patterns; it does not follow, of course, that those patterns are uninfluenced by the character of the formal organization. (Selznick, 1943: 50). • Weber’s views diverge sharply from the popular stereotypes which see bureaucracy as synonymous with governmental inefficiency. To Weber, bureaucracy was one of the characteristic and ubiquitous forms of administration in modern society, not confined to government by any means. Moreover, he held it to be one of the most efficient forms of organization which had historically developed, superseding the undependable amateur with the qualified specialist. (Gouldner: 1954). • Weber conceived of bureaucracy as the social mechanism that maximizes efficiency in administration and also as a form of social organization with specific characteristics. (Blau, 1956: 251). • Bureaucratic patterns are so deeply ingrained in the culture that they mold not only the individual’s work habits, but also his social designs, and even his expressions of religious belief. (Denhardt, 1968: 441) • Almost all modern administrative organizations (as well as some ancient ones) are bureaucratically organized. (Blau & Scott, 1962: 32) • Bureaucracy is an organizational form that employs rational-legal means to pursue collective goals ... [it] has a budget, a professional staff, elected officers, an operations manual, formal committees ... and written policies, rules, and procedures. (Martin, 2013: 283). • Mechanistic systems (sc. “bureaucracies”) define his functions, together with the methods, responsibilities, and powers appropriate to them; in other words, however, this means that boundaries are set ... “mechanistic, appeared to be appropriate to an enterprise operating under relatively stable conditions. The other, “organic, appeared to be required for conditions of change. (Burns & Stalker, 1961: 5). • It is more useful to regard bureaucracy as being characteristic of the structure of an organization and relate given organizational forms to group and individual behavior. We have been able to conceptualize six elements to be considered as dimensions of organizational structure. All these dimensions are in fact variables, and it will be possible for an organization to be rated at any point along the continuum. (Pugh et al., 1963: 298). • Bureaucratic vertical forms severely hamper the ability to respond to accelerating competition. Flexible forms, in contrast, can respond to a wide variety of changes in the competitive environment in an appropriate and timely way. (Volberda, 1996: 359). • The model of bureaucratic control discussed herein reduces many variables and relationships to a few relationships among key variables of formal structures. Hence, the topic becomes tractable rather than hopelessly complex (Walton, 2005: 571).
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Perspective 3: Bureaucracy as a Type

TABLE A2
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- *Pugh and Hickson (1989) refer to a structure in which structuring of activities is high and concentration of authority is low as a “workflow bureaucracy.” To be “bureaucratic,” in this sense, is simply to be more highly structured. (Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010: 610)*
 - *A useful way of thinking about a bureaucracy is that it consists of those positions or activities whose function is to service and maintain the organization itself. In short, we define bureaucracy as the existence of a specialized administrative staff. Like formalization and goal specificity, bureaucracy should be viewed as a variable; organizations vary in terms of the proportion of personnel they devote to administration as compared to production and service. (Scott, 2007: 45)*
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